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6. 1994 FOREWORD 
On  8  January  1993  the  European  Parliament's  Committee  on  Development  and 
Cooperation decided to hold  a  public hearing on  the subject of  Demography  and 
Development,  partly  because  of  the  crucial  importance  of  this  issue  to 
development  policy in general  and partly because of  the need  for  the European 
Parliament  to adopt  a  position on  this subject before the  World  Conference  on 
Population in Cairo on 5-13 September 1994.  In order to provide the Members  with 
valuable  background material  and  to serve as  a  reference  for  future  debates  -
both  in connection with  the Cairo  conference and afterwards  - the Directorate 
General  for Research has been requested to publish the contributions of expert 
at the hearing. 
The present paper includes the introduction by the Chairman of the Committee and 
the contributions of the experts invited to the hearing,  but not the discussion 
following  these contributions.  Finally,  for  the ready reference of  the reader, 
the  European  Parliament's  Resolution  of  11  March  1994  on  the  Demographic 
Situation and  Development  is annexed. 
DIRECTORATE  GENERAL  FOR  RESEARCH 
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- 9  -INTRODUCTION 
by the Chairman of the Committee on Development and Cooperation Mr  Henri  Saby 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
We  shall endeavour today to take a  long, hard look at the problem of population 
growth and development,  and to help us  we  have  the following  eminent experts: 
Mrs  Rajamani  Rowley,  Head  of  Population  Concern,  London.  Of  Malaysian 
origin,  she has  spent  many  years of her life studying population problems, 
Mrs  Sophie Apostolopoulos, President of the Greek Family Planning Association 
in  Athens.  A  few  weeks  ago  in  Greece,  she  met  various  members  of  our 
committee to discuss  the question under consideration today, 
Professor Okoth-Ogendo,  from  Nairobi,  President of the National Council  for 
Population and  Development, 
Professor Dominique Tabutin,  from  the Institute of Population Studies at the 
Catholic University of  Louvain, 
Professor Georges Tapinos,  from  the Institute of Political Science in Paris, 
Mr  van  Ginneken,  from  the  Dutch  Interdisciplinary  Institute of  Population 
Studies,  the Hague,  and 
Dr.  Michael  Bohnet,  from  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development,  Germany. 
As  you  will see,  the subject is very big.  We  have therefore asked the experts 
to consider the  fundamental  points in the  light of  a  number  of related  issues 
i.e. the environment,  economic aspects,  family  planning,  implementation of  the 
relevant  programmes,  and  to select  from  the Asian  and  African traditions  some 
elements  that involve the place of  women  in the  family  and  in society. 
However,  before  giving  the  floor  to  the  experts,  I  should  like  to  briefly 
outline  the  problem  as  it  presents  itself  in  the  context  of  development 
cooperation,  but also, quite simply,  as it is perceived by the European citizen. 
Some  time  ago  I  suggested  that  our  committee  hold  a  public  hearing  on  the 
subject of Population and Development,  because this is an issue in which we  are 
deeply  interested,  and  because,  involving  a  variety  of  disciplines,  it lends 
itself perfectly to an exchange of views with experts whose  experience is drawn 
from  a  range of  fields.  The  Commission and Council  are giving serious  thought 
to the matter and the  UN  will hold a  conference on  Population in September next 
year in Cairo.  Parliament will have to adopt a  position,  in due course,  on this 
issue.  We  should not be content merely to study statistical surveys and general 
trends,  but  seek  to  better  identify  the  risks  and  benefits  of  a  growing 
population  for  the  developing  countries  and  for  Europe,  and  determine  what 
measures  we  take  among  the  peoples  directly  concerned  to  safeguard  their 
interests and afford them  help. 
No~ comes  our first question:  Is population growth essentially regional or is 
i t.,,a  planetary phenomenon?  Does  it only concern us Europeans indirect  1  y,  or is 
it,  on  the contrary,  a  direct threat?  No  expertise in semantics  is needed  to 
- 11  -understand  the  emotive  force  of  words  like  overpopulation,  or  population 
explosion.  Witness  the  irrational  fears  of  the  people  of  Europe  during  the 
debate  on  political asylum  in France,  Germany  and  the Netherlands  but also  in 
other parts of  the Community  and  Western  Europe  occasioned by  increased  flows 
of  people  from  East  to West  and  South  to North.  All  too  often this  issue  is 
surrounded  by  panic  and  hysteria.  We  are  told  that  we  have  had  just  about 
enough.  But  what  is the greatest danger?  Can  one,  indeed,  genuinely speak of 
danger?  Does  it really come  from  the South?  Or,  rather,  from  the East?  Do  we 
need  to  spell  out  how  and  why  the  North  American  continent  was  peopled  by 
immigrants  from  Europe  in the last century?  And  why  the arbitrary claim that 
the influx of  foreigners threatens our culture and welfare system?  Are  we  not 
tempted to forget that they make  an important contribution to society, at a  time 
when  our  population is aging?  More  generally,  how  are  we  to view  population 
constraints when  interdependence at planetary level is increasingly evident? 
Another  aspect  of  the  problem  is  the  environment.  Thousands  of  square 
kilometres  of  virgin  forest  vanish  every  year,  whilst  the  desert  further 
encroaches  on  the  Sahel  through deforestation and  over grazing.  The  planet's 
resources grow scarcer,  food staples go down  and a  severe water shortage  looms. 
Here  in Europe  we  still think that the situation is pretty satisfactory.  Not 
content to monstrously wreck the environment,  to pollute the air,  to use up 80% 
of  the  planet's  resources  though  we  represent  not  more  than  one-fifth of  the 
world's  population,  we  buy  raw  materials  cheap  and  ignore  the  cost  to  the 
environment  because  we  have  the necessary purchasing power.  Is our  taste for 
luxury really justifiable today,  when  we  consider the state of  the planet?  Do 
we  not  have  to  reconsider  our  often cynical  views  about  surplus  population? 
The  reaction  of  the  developing  countries  at  the  Rio  Conference  made  this 
perfectly  clear.  This  planet  might  be  able  to  take  even  more  people,  whose 
dignity  would  be  respected,  if  everyone  finally  agreed  to  accept  their 
responsibilities  more  completely  and  show  more  solidarity.  Must  we  wait  for 
cataclysms to strike, for famine to ravage an entire continent and for the fight 
for a  share of the wealth to reach such a  pitch before man's conscience finally 
stirs? 
we  have  just  touched  on  something  which  informs  our  entire  strategy  for 
development  cooperation:  partnership across the  planet,  founded  on solidarity 
between all its people.  How  can the Community  help the developing countries in 
their problems with population growth and the economy?  Can  the situation really 
be brought under control?  At  any rate,  the strings attached to development aid 
by donor countries in terms of measures to be taken by the beneficiary countries 
to control  population growth are unacceptable. 
Difficulties  exist  at  very  many  levels,  and  economic  problems  bulk  large. 
Poverty,  famine  and  over-population  are  inseparable:  whilst  the  situation 
steadily worsens,  we  cannot provide definite proof  that over-population is the 
cause  of  poverty.  Why  the  Chinese  model  does  not  work  in  Africa,  a  rather 
unfair  question  in  this  context,  was  raised  on  the  occasion  of  the  Joint 
Assembly's last meeting in Brussels.  We  should not forget that child labour is 
an important economic factor in some  of the newly-industrialized countries such 
as  India and Pakistan. 
In this connection,  it is undeniable that the developing countries,  faced with 
a  population  growth  of  3%,  cannot  solve  their  economic  problems  without  help 
from outside.  The  situation is nothing short of explosive in many  parts of the 
world.  As  a  rule,  consumption deprives the national economy  of resources which 
should  go  into  productive  investment  i.e.  to  provide  training  and  improve 
- 12  -productivity.  But  are these countries'  efforts at development  bound  to fail? 
And  how  effective can a  population policy be  which  seeks to maintain  the rate 
of  growth  within  the  limits of  economic possibilities?  What  contribution can 
the Community  make  in this area?  What  regional disparities are there,  and what 
are  their  causes?  How  will  AIDS  affect  the  population  over  large  areas, 
especially  in  Africa?  How  can  we  help  check  the  spread  of  this  terrible 
scourge? 
Finally,  there is a  balance  to be  struck between the interests of  society and 
the right of each man  or woman  to shape their own  life,  in particular to decide 
on  the  size  of  their  family  and  the  number  of  children  they  have.  To  what 
extent can the State intervene in this sphere of private life,  and what are the 
means  at its disposal?  Is it really possible to inculcate in the individual a 
sense of collective responsibility to the society?  On  the other hand,  can  the 
individual  legitimately expect society to take care of his children?  Clearly, 
the advice dispensed in family planning programmes to bring down  the birth rate, 
influences  the decisions  people  take.  But  does  it take  their  interests  into 
account?  As  things  now  stand,  are  women  free  to  make  their  own  choices? 
Judging by  the many  unwanted pregnancies and the extremely hazardous nature of 
abortions,  this  seems  doubtful. 
I  am  aware that other cultures are not  faced with some  of  the problems  we  have 
made  for  ourselves,  with  our  compulsive  rationalization,  our  conviction  that 
just about anything is possible,  our anxious pursuit of happiness,  which drives 
so many  of us,  and because an exaggeratedly individualistic approach to life 1s 
not necessarily a  proof  of  wisdom. 
For all these reasons,  then,  we  need in this hearing to consider the world view 
and traditions of other peoples.  How,  in Africa and Asia,  do  ideas about life, 
the protection and propagation of life,  influence the size of  the  family?  Are 
these  deeply  rooted  convictions?  Do  they  involve  economic  and  social 
considerations,  such as providing against old age?  To  what  extent has contact 
with  Western  cultures,  particularly  in  the  areas  of  education,  training  and 
employment,  brought about change?  How  has it affected population numbers?  What 
is the status of  women  within the  family  and society?  Are  their prospects any 
different now  from  those they have  faced traditionally?  Also to be considered 
are the convictions of  the world's great religious communities  who,  as  a  force 
to  be  reckoned  with,  often  want  a  hand  in  the  shaping  of  government  policy, 
particularly when it comes to demographic issues,  but refuse to accept the real-
life consequences.  Note  the Vatican's unyieldingly hard line in this area and 
the  criticism  and  potent  opposition  from  the  Catholic  Church.  On  the  other 
hand, it should not be forgotten that in some  countries compulsory sterilization 
is widely practised. 
After  this  brief  review  of  the  subject,  I  would  now  ask  you  to  help  our 
committee prepare a  few  basic ideas,  with the help of  the experts present,  for 
a  position by  Parliament on  the  issue of population and  development. 
- 13  -II.  CONTRIBUTIONS  OF  THE 
PARTICIPATING  EXPERTS 
- 15  -1.  FAMILY  PLANNING:  CHOICES  AND  RESPONSIBILITIES 
Mrs  Rajamani  Rowley 
Director 
Population Concern,  London 
Mr.  President,  Parliamentarians,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen 
I  feel  privileged to be  here,  and  to  speak  to  you  this morning.  I  do  so  as  a 
woman,  as  a  Third  Worlder,  and  as  someone  who  has  spent  most  of  a  lifetime 
promoting  the  cause  of  birth planning,  reproductive  health,  and  the  right  of 
women  to make  decisions about  their own  fertility. 
Ever  since  the  1960s  - when  Paul  Ehrlich  wrote  his  bestselling  book,  The 
Population Bomb,  the  idea of  controlling runaway  population  growth has  been  a 
hot  topic.  It  has  been  beset  by  controversy  and  tension.  Perhaps  that  was 
inevitable.  Perhaps  controversy has  helped to mature our thinking. 
At  the heart  of  confusion,  has  been  the conflict over  how  we  should deal  with 
our  fertility.  Population  control  implies  interference  in  intimate  personal 
decisions,  and  the very natural human  desire for  children. 
As  Professor  Roger  Revelle  has  said,  children  have  always  provided  hope, 
security,  participation and  remembrance.  "Hope  that the  future will  be  better 
than the present,  security that the future will not be worse  than the present, 
participation in shaping  our  future,  remembrance  - a  kind  of  immortality,  so 
that something will last after we  are dead." 
Thirty  years  later,  a  simple  fact  remains.  In  a  free  society decisions  about 
marriage,  sexual behaviour and family size are made  within the home  and family. 
They  are,  and  should be,  free choices. 
In an uncertain world  there are  a  few  other certainties. 
Rapid  improvements  in death  control  have  brought  down  mortality  rates  almost 
everywhere,  especially among  children.  Birth rates are now  falling too,  in most 
developing  countries.  BUT  the  young  age  profile of  the  population  means  that 
there is a  tremendous  momentum  for growth. 
As  a  result  within  the  last  second,  three  more  people  have  been  added  to  the 
world total.  Each  day,  another  250,000  souls are added  to the human  family.  In 
this  critical  decade  the  absolute  increase  will  be  the  greatest  ever,  an 
addition of  96 million this year,  rising to 100  million each year by the end of 
the 'century. 
The  6th  billion  expected  in  1998  and  the  medium  projection  for  2025  is  8.5 
billion.  The  eventual  stabilised  total  on  this  projection will  be  around  11 
billion,  or if the transition to the two-child family is delayed,  15  billion or 
more. 
Which  of these scenarios comes  about,  depends very much  on whether we  grasp the 
opportunities to speed up the transition in the remaining years of this century. 
If the  population  juggernaut  is  allowed  to  roll  on  its  present  course  for 
another  seven  years,  the  momentum  may  be  too  great  to  slow  - at  least  in  a 
civilised fashion. 
- 17  -But,  I  do not wish to pursue this population theme  further now.  I  would rather 
use  the  time  I  have  left,  to stress another certainty. 
A reproductive revolution is spreading across much  of the developing world.  Use 
of effective contraception has risen rapidly.  Fertility has  been falling. 
Many  developing  countries,  such  as  Thailand,  Korea  or  Sri  Lanka,  have  seen 
average  family  size fall  from  six  to  between  two  and  three  in  twenty  years. 
Others  like Mexico  and  Colombia are well  along  the  same  road.  Bangladesh,  one 
of  the world's poorest nations has seen family size fall  from  seven to a  little 
over five in the last decade.  Even  Kenya,  which had the world's fastest growth 
rate and  families  of  eight children has  seen this  number  fall  in the last  few 
years. 
Overall,  family size in developing countries has dropped  from  an average of six 
children to four  in the last  30  years. 
There has been a  sea-change in desired family size in almost every region of the 
world.  In most countries outside Africa,  at least half of all married women  do 
not want  any more children.  Even  in Africa,  almost all the surveys show  that at 
least half of all married women  either want  to postpone their next pregnancy or 
do  not  want  any  more  children. 
The  tragedy  we  face  today  is that  services have  not  kept  pace  with the demand 
for voluntary family  planning services. 
Just  a  quick word  then on  four  aspects of  this dilemma: 
F1rst:  the huge  unmet  need  for  family  planning 
Second:  the special  needs of  young  people 
Third:  the neglected question of  male  responsibility 
and Fourth:  the urgent need for better international cooperation in dealing with 
these matters. 
Demographic  and health surveys  from  around the world show  that there remains  a 
huge  unmet  need for  family  planning services.  They  indicate that more  than one 
out of every five married women  outside of China  - or some  120 million - is out 
of  reach  of  family  planning  advice  and  services.  And  these  surveys  exclude 
single,  separated,  divorced and  widowed  women. 
If their needs could be met,  it would vastly improve the health and life chances 
of women  and children.  It would save the lives of many  of the  500,000  women  who 
die each year from pregnancy related causes,  and most of the two million infants 
who  perish  as  a  result  of  being  born  too  closely  spaced.  It  would  also  slow 
population growth rates by the equivalent of at least one child per woman.  That 
alone would bring about the three-child family.  That alone would bring the world 
half way  to replacement level,  and set us  on course for stable world population 
nearer  to  10  than  15  billion. 
Such calculations are valuable,  because they  show  that governments  can achieve 
their  demographic  aims  without  panic  driven  targets,  which  often  lead  to 
insensitive top-down  programmes. 
- 18  -But  they do  not address at least two  key  issues,  which  I  would  like to stress. 
First:  much  of this unmet  need is among  poor and marginal communities either in 
remote  rural  areas  or  in  the  rapidly  growing  shanty  towns  of  the  developing 
world. 
Second:  if services are to succeed they must  focus  on the client and they must 
use strategic approaches which provide access  to a  range of  methods,  and which 
are affordable and acceptable. 
All  this  has  to  be  supported  with  proper  counselling,  careful  monitoring  by 
paramedics and field workers,  and supervision of staff. 
Last  week  I  was  in Pakistan.  This is a  country where contraceptive use is less 
than  15  per cent.  Nearly five months  ago  one of  the western donors  had cut all 
aid to Pakistan.  As  a  result various  family  planning  programmes  had  come  to  a 
grinding halt.  Within the  NGO  sector: 
150  family  planning clinics closed down 
36  voluntary surgical centres were  shut 
30  community  based  family  planning programmes  ceased operation 
4000  family  planning workers  were  laid off  and 
some  300,000  contraceptive users had  become  non  users. 
Access to services and quality care had had a  tremendous  impact in some  of these 
project locations.  Within  18 months contraceptive prevalence had increased from 
13  per  cent  to  some  30  per  cent.  And  now,  many  of  these  families  who  live  on 
less than  50  pence  a  day  cannot  afford commercial  rates  for  the services  they 
require. 
International  donors  and  governments  must  begin  to  put  people  first,  and  be 
consistent in the way  they administer programmes  which directly affect people's 
lives. 
Let  me  now  move  on  to adolescent fertility.  Teenage  pregnancy  is a  problem  in 
all countries.  Whether it is the result of early or  imposed marriage,  or sexual 
experimentation,  it puts at risk the health of both mother  and  child. 
The  emphasis  in surveys has usually been  on  married  women.  This  fa1ls  to  take 
into account  the huge  unmet  need of  unmarr1ed  teenagers.  It is estimated that 
each year more  than 20  million young girls,  between  15  and  19,  falls pregnant. 
Perhaps  five million of  these will opt  for  an abortion.  Where  this is illegal 
the procedure may  kill or maim  them.  The  others will  go  through with an often 
unwanted pregnancy,  that may  seriously harm  their health and life chances.  The 
majority of these pregnancies owe  a  great deal to society's permissive attitude 
to male  sexuality. 
The  needs  of  both  young  men  and  women  for  family  life  education  and 
contraception  must  be  a  priority.  Of  the  hundreds  millions  of  adolescents 
requ1r1ng  sexual  and  reproductive health services,  only  a  few  lucky ones  have 
access  to good quality information,  advice,  contraceptives  and health care. 
- 19  -In many  societies providing  such education  and services is a  delicate matter. 
Yet  education  on  sexuality,  family  life and  reproductive  health  can  help  to 
promote  a  common  value  system.  It  can  promote  mutual  respect  and  equality 
between men  and women.  It can reduce unwanted pregnancies,  abortion and the risk 
of  sexually transmitted diseases. 
The  other neglected issue involves the men.  As  I  travel in my  job,  I  bring back 
with  me  the  images,  voices  and  memories  of  the  people  I  have  met.  Early  this 
year  I  was  in Sierra  Leone,  staying in  the villages  and  meeting  with chiefs, 
tribal leaders and  local men  and women.  In every village the principal concern 
was  the high rate of  infant mortality. 
Both  men  and  women  expressed  anguish at  the  loss of  children  and  the  need  to 
replace this loss. Their children were dying of tuberculosis, measles,  diarrhoea 
and  whooping  cough.  Many  of  the  women  I  spoke  to  were  exhausted  from  their 
triple workloads:  work  in their households,  labouring  in the  field  and  their 
reproductive roles. 
I  talked to a  woman  less than  30  years old.  She  wept  and said "I bore  my  first 
child  when  I  was  1  5  years  old.  I  have  had  11  pregnancies  and  only  three 
surviving children.  This  child in my  arms  is nine months  and  he has  been ill a 
long  time.  I  know  I  am  going  to lose him  too.  I  am  tired of child bearing but 
the decision to have children is my  husband's.  I  have no  charge over my  body." 
In  the  developing  world,  men  are  usually  the  decision  makers  in  areas  of 
contraceptive use and reproductive behaviour. Only recently have family planning 
programmes  come  to  realise  that  men  are  an  important  target  audience  for 
information and education.  This failure to educate has  kept  men  from  taking an 
active  role  in  family  planning.  Traditional  methods  such  as  abstention  and 
withdrawal  requires  it  ...  moving  to  more  effective  methods  should  increase 
rather than decrease male  involvement.  Alas,  the number  of methods  open  to men 
is limited. 
Besides  being  users,  male  op1.n1.on  leaders  have  helped  to  legitimise  family 
planning programmes within local communi ties. Village leaders, religious leaders 
and politicians can have  a  tremendous  influence. 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen ... 
Resources  for  family  planning  need  to  double  if international  targets  and 
demographic  goals  are  to  be  achieved.  The  amounts  of  money  required  are  not 
great,  for  such an  important objective. 
We  are talking about increasing annual spending to support population activities 
from  4.5  billion  US  dollars  to  9  billion dollars  by  the  end  of  century.  Of 
today's total expenditure,  3.5  billion dollars are  provided by  the developing 
countries themselves.  But some  of the poorest countries have the greatest need. 
The  international  community  must  rise to the challenge. 
I  cannot  think of  a  better investment in all our  futures. 
- 20  -For the European  Union  I  have  four  suggestions: 
First:  Existing  support  for  population  should  be  more  clearly  stated  and 
promoted. 
Second:  Although resources have increased,  they fall short of the need set out, 
and agreed,  at the Amsterdam  Forum  and elsewhere. 
Third:  Expertise on population within the Commission should be strengthened to 
ensure that  funds  are effectively used. 
Fourth:  A population unit should be established within the Commission to ensure 
coordination between the two  Directorates,  DG1  and  DG  VIII,  and to work closely 
with the very  few  population NGOs  in Europe. 
- 21  -2.  THE  POPULATION  PROBLEM  AND  FAMILY  PLANNING  AND  WOMEN  IN  EUROPE 
Mrs  Sophie Apostolopoulos,  President of the Greek Family Planning Association, 
Athens. 
Next Autumn the United Nations is organizing in Cairo the Third World Conference 
of its Member  States:  the subject is population growth and development. 
The  aim  of  this  Conference  is to study  and chart population policies  for  our 
planet  for  the decade ahead. 
It should be noted that this conference  follows  the  UN  World  Conference on the 
Environment  held  two  years  ago  in Rio  de  Janeiro  and  the  World  Conference  on 
Human  Rights  held  one  year  ago  in Vienna.  The  UN  is thus establishing a  link 
between  these three mutually  interdependent sectors. 
Advocates  of  family  planning  and  workers  in  this  sector  frequently  find 
themselves confronted with the  following questions: 
Is there any link between the population issue and the policies in this field 
that are either planned or already being implemented at local or world level, 
and  the planning services? 
What  direct or indirect  impact do  they have  on  the protection and promotion 
of the fundamental rights of man  and more specifically:  what steps are taken 
to  guarantee  the  right  recognized  by  the  United  Nations  of  each  citizen, 
regardless of sex,  race,  colour and religion,  freely to choose the number  of 
children  he/she  wishes  to  have,  when  he/she  wishes  to  have  them  and  the 
interval between  them? 
The  demographic  approach  to this problem  is of  course valid in its own  terms; 
it uses specific data to shed light on  the current situation in the world  and 
to  make  projections  for  the  decades  ahead.  However,  despite  the  significant 
contribution it has  made  in charting out this problem,  it cannot  be  an  end  in 
itself  and  constitute  the  only  criterion  for  drawing  up  a  population  policy 
addressed at men  and  women  with their realistic desire to live in dignity. 
It  is  therefore  essential  to  address  this  problem  as  part  of  measures  to 
safeguard the right of human  beings to have children,  which is the  'mission'  of 
the non-governmental  family  planning bodies  which are working  in this area as 
members  of  the  International  Family  Planning Federation  (IFPF)  to  promote  the 
relevant services provided in more  than  140  countries all over  the world. 
The  objective pursued by  the IFPF  since its foundation in 1952  demonstrate its 
humanitarian  approach,  the  importance  attached  to  women's  issues  and  its 
interest in tackling population problems.  These  include: 
the promotion of training in family planning and responsible sexual conduct; 
the  fostering  of  mental  and  physical  health  through  the  promotion  of,  and 
support  for,  effective  family  planning  services  (parents,  children,  young 
people); 
- 22  -measures  to  support  scientific  research  regarding  all  aspects  of  human 
fertility and  means  of  regulating it;  the dissemination of  the results for 
the benefit of  the general public; 
the provision of  information and training in demographic problems  (at  local 
and  international levels). 
These  objectives will  provide  a  framework  for  the  IFPF's  proposals during the 
preliminary  UN  committee  meetings  which  have  been  convoked  and  which  will 
continue to meet  to prepare the agenda of  the Cairo  Conference. 
The  term  'population problem'  is employed and interpreted differently by  family 
planning workers. 
It concerns us but  we  do  not  feel  comfortable with it. 
The  knowledge  that  this  term  has  often  been  used  to  provoke  feelings  of 
culpability and shame,  notably among  the female population,  leads us to believe 
that the so-called  'population problem',  even as an idea,  is contrary to family 
planning,  and  militates  against  the  free  exercise  of  human  rights,  since  it 
serves economic,  political, national and nationalistic objectives in a  struggle 
pitting the weak  against  the strong. 
The  horror  stories  in  Caeusescu's  Romania  up  to  1989  are still fresh  in  our 
minds: 
The  infamous  population policy  of  the  former  dictator  sought  to  increase  the 
population of Romania within ten years by  between 23  and 30  million inhabitants. 
In  order  to  achieve  this  goal  all  access  to  family  planning  and  information 
services was  forbidden. 
Abortion  was  permitted  only  for  women  over  45  years  of  age  with  five  or more 
children. 
In all other  cases  it was  banned  and  also  a  punishable  offence  for  both  the 
women  and  the doctors  involved. 
Contraception  was  also  forbidden  so  that  illegal  backstreet  abortions 
constituted the main method of birth control:  86%  of mortality among  mothers was 
due  to this. 
After  the fall  of  the  regime  in December  1989  abortion was  legalized and  over 
the following six months mortality among  mothers fell by  317%  (data provided by 
the WHO). 
Even  in  European  countries,  in  which,  at  least  officially,  no  specific 
population policies are pursued,  misguided notions concerning the desirability 
of  increasing increase  in the national  population are encouraged by  the State 
and the Church so that the quality of family planning services provided suffers 
and this undoubtedly leads to an increase in the number  of backstreet abortions 
and mortality among  the  female  population. 
- 23  -In particular  : 
As  far as family planning is concerned,  we  currently find the same desperate 
needs  and  shortcomings  in Europe as  in Third World countries; 
In  the  former  Soviet  Union  most  women  use  abortion  as  their  only  form  of 
birth control because other methods are of poor quality and based on outdated 
technology.  The  average woman  has  between  five and seven abortions between 
15  and  45  years  of  age; 
According  to  WHO  data  in  1990  over  700  000  women  had  an  illegal, 
'backstreet',  abortion and  447  of  these died as  a  result; 
In  Armenia,  according  to  government  sources,  women  have  an  average  of  six 
abortions;  the Red  Cross  puts  the figure at 20; 
In  Russia  today,  108.6  women  out  of  every  1000  undergo  an  abortion  and 
mortality among  mothers is almost  47  out of  100  000,  the highest figure per 
number  of  abortions  in the world; 
In  Albania  neither  women  nor  men  had  access  to  primary  health  services  or 
family  planning up  to  one  year ago. 
Modern  contraception  methods  are  practically  unknown  and,  of 
inadequate.  'Traditional'  methods  are  ineffective,  resulting 
abortion rates and  figures  for mortality among  mothers. 
course, 
in  high 
Despite  the  geographical,  political,  religious,  linguistic,  cultural  and 
national  specificities of  each of  the countries  in Central  and  Eastern Europe 
(the former Soviet republics, Albania,  the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia,  Slovenia,  the Republics of Cental Asia,  etc.),  they have the following 
in common 
as  a  'general picture': 
a  dismal  economic  situation; 
ineffective services structures; 
poverty affecting large sections of  the population; 
non-existent or  inadequate social policies; 
shortages  in essential products  (pharmaceuticals,  food,  fuel,  etc.); 
political instability and war; 
mass  refugee movements; 
at family  planning level: 
family planning associations are not everywhere available; 
there  are  problems  in  communicating  with  and  approaching  the  public,  due  to 
religious and social  'rules',  for instance in the case of Muslims  and gipsies. 
- 24  -Family  planning  workers  are  regarded  with  distrust  and  the  population  lacks 
confidence in the services they provide; 
Sex  hygiene  and  education is poor or even non-existent. 
In  other  words,  beyond  the  need  for  material  infrastructures  and  staff  for 
family  planning services,  a  change  in mentality and new  models  are required. 
This is the priority objective for the IFPF  and special programmes have already 
been  launched  involving  every  type  of  assistance  in  the countries  of  Eastern 
Europe. 
In  certain countries  attempts  are  being  made  due  to  religious  influences  or 
national priorities,  to abolish women's  right to safe and  legal abortions. 
The  official Croatian model  for  'demographic revival'  expects  families  to have 
between three and  four children and is therefore opposed to abortions,  divorce 
and  the professional activity of  women. 
In  Ireland  and  Poland,  countries  in  which  abortion  is  prohibited,  women  have 
found  an  original  solution:  they  go  on  weekend  trips  to  have  abortions  in 
neighbouring countries. 
It is  a  fact  that  the  small  family  is  thriving  in  Europe  and  the  population 
growth  curve is declining. 
This should under no circumstances be seen as an isolated phenomenon,  but in the 
context of the general conditions which determine citizens'  lives  (the economy, 
social  policy,  the  quality  of  health,  unemployment,  education,  likelihood  of 
political instability). 
This  cannot  serve as  an alibi  for  a  population policy  which  ignores  the human 
right to reproduction,  puts the blame on women  and violates her right to express 
her sexuality when,  with  whom  and  however  she wishes. 
It  is  not  fair  to  use  woman's  child-bearing  function  as  a  target  for  these 
policies and to put the onus on women  to  'behave responsibly',  thereby depriv~ng 
them  of  the  ability  to  participate  in  decision-making  concerning  their  own 
private  lives  and  also  in  drawing  up  policies  on  national  and  international 
bodies. 
Europe  needs  an  overall  population policy:  discussions,  studies and  proposals 
are  necessary  to  allow  a  comprehensive  approach  to  the  subject,  taking  into 
account of course  the specific circumstances obtaining in individual states. 
If population  policies are  to  be  considered  fair  and  effective,  they  must  be 
based  in  the  principle  of  social  justice  and  promote  the  well-being  of  the 
population. 
- 25  -In view of  the  1994  UN  World Conference: 
In the expectation that effective population policies  will be drawn up  for 
the decade ahead,  let us bear  in mind  that: 
by  the  year  2002  the  present  world  population  of  5  billion will  have 
risen to  6  billion; 
the factors which influence fertility are directly linked to development, 
and notably economic,  social and  human  development; 
less than 1%  of world development aid is spent on population policies and 
family  planning,  sectors  which will  contribute to  improving social  and 
economic conditions on a  small and large scale and  improving the quality 
of  the environment. 
In the  l1ght of  the  above,  let us declare our  support  for  a  uniform  framework 
for action at world level and the right of every person to freedom of choice and 
dignity and let us  continue to watch over  the future  of  our planet. 
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P~ofessor H.W.O.  Okoth-Ogendo,  Professor of Public Law,  University of Nairobi 
and chairman of the National  Council  for Population and Development,  Kenya 
Honourable  members  of  the Committee,  distinguished Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
1.  Let  me  start by  thanking you  for  the singular honour  you  have accorded me 
and  my  country  by  inviting me  to address  you  on  this  important  issue.  It 
is  most  fitting  that  the  theme  of  the  Cairo  conference  next  year  - the 
third  in  the  series  organized  by  the  United  Nations  - should  be  on  the 
relationship between population and development.  For although the issue of 
population has been on the agenda of the international community for a  very 
long time,  its development implications have not always been systematically 
explored  at  that  level.  The  scant,  and  in  some  ways,  cavalier attention 
which the population issue received at the Earth Summit  in Rio  de Janeiro 
last year is clear evidence of this. 
2.  Instead the international  community  has  been concerned  - and  I  dare  say, 
excessively concerned - with the orchestration of various scenarios of doom 
based  on  current  growth rates and  absolute numbers  of  people  in relation 
to what  is seen as  the very  limited resources available to mankind.  These 
scenarios,  especially  as  regards  Africa,  have  been  clear,  graphic  and 
frightening.  The  message  to  be  drawn  from  them  is that  unless  something 
drastic is done to reduce population growth rates - currently estimated at 
1.7%  globally,  2.3%  in the third world  (excluding China)  and  3%  in Africa, 
a  malthusian  catastrophe  of  immense  proportions  is  inevitable.  The 
prescription which has been handed down  to the third world generally,  and 
Africa in particular, is vigorous fertility reduction policies anchored by 
comprehensive  family planning programmes. 
3.  And  yet  it  should  be  obvious  that  what  is  important  is  not  fertility 
reduction per se.  The  small  family  "norm"  is not  necessarily  appropriate 
for all societies at all stages of  development.  What  is important  is how 
to  balance  human  numbers  and  the rate at  which  these  are  growing  or not 
growing and the rate at which  the resources needed by  that population are 
being generated,  consumed  and  sustained.  In other  words,  population is a 
problem only when  it outstrips the capacity of  the development process to 
sustain it. That is an issue which requires that attention be paid to both 
human  and  natural  resource  development  and  management.  For  a  country's 
population is,  first and  foremost,  its most  important  resource. 
4.  Available  statistics  indicate  that  while  Africa's  population  is  still 
growing at about  3%  per year,  African economies are generally in stagnation 
due  largely to the lack of capacity,  by its own  population,  to manage  the 
enterprise of development.  Wars,  pestilence and political instability have 
compounded  this state of  affairs by  creating one  of  the  largest internal 
human  displacement  conditions  in  any  continent.  Thus  Africa  remains  the 
only  continent  that  is  unable  to  grow  enough  food  to  feed  its  people. 
Indeed every  indication is that African economies are unlikely to recover 
soon. 
5.  The  challenge for governments  in Africa is therefore threefold.  First the 
continent must  seek to develop its human  resources to ensure that capacity 
exists  for  endogenously  propelled  development.  Education,  skills  and 
- 27  -management  training,  science  and  technology  development,  improvement  of 
public  health,  and  investment  in  social  infrastructure must,  therefore, 
take priority in the continent's development  agenda.  Second  the continent 
must break out of the stranglehold of international capital which has been 
and  remains  the  fundamental  cause  of  its  underdevelopment.  Third,  the 
continent must strive to put its institutions of governance in order as  a 
means  of creating and enabling environment  for development. 
6.  Only in this context will fertility reduction policies and family planning 
programmes  make  sense.  For  the goal  then would  be  to restore and maintain 
the equilibrium between population growth and resource availability through 
development  and reduction in growth rates.  This is an option which  Europe 
and North America did not have to take.  The demographic transition in those 
continents  was  not  reached  through  family  planning  or  modern  methods  of 
contraception. It occurred at least in Europe inter alia,  through plagues, 
an  agrarian  revolution,  industrial  revolutions,  industrialisation  and 
imperialism. 
7.  As  a  result  nearly  all  African  countries,  including  my  own,  now  have 
fertility reduction policies and  family  planning  programmes.  Contrary  to 
early  concerns  about  the  supposed  cultural  impenetrability  of  African 
social  structures  to  fertility  reduction,  modest  achievements  have  been 
recorded on this front in a  number of countries including Kenya,  Zimbabwe, 
Botswana and Mauritius.  Let me  turn to Kenya  with which I  am  most familiar. 
8.  The  demographic  profile of  Kenya  has  previously  been  characterized  by  a 
high population growth rate due mainly to an exceptionally high fertility 
regime.  Thus  the first population census conducted in 1948 recorded a  total 
of  5.4  million people.  This  increased  to  some  8.6  million  in  1962;  10.9 
million in  1969;  and  16  million in  1979. 
9.  A  turning point  was  reached  in  1989  when  for  the  first  time,  there  was 
evidence  that  fertility  levels  had  started declining.  A  Demographic  and 
Health  Survey  (DHS)  conducted  in  that  year  indicated  that  the  total 
fertility rate  (TFR)  had declined  from  8.1  live births per  woman  in  1984 
to  6.7.  A  second  DHS  conducted  in  1993  now  indicates  that  the  TFR  has 
further declined to 5. 4.  The  corresponding trends in population growth rate 
have consequently changed from  3.8%  in 1979  to 3.4%  in 1989.  The  aim is to 
achieve a  TFR  of 5.2 and growth rate of 2.5%  by  the year 2000.  As  a  result, 
the  country's  population is currently  estimated at  25  million;  a  figure 
which is expected to rise to abort  32  million by  the year  2000. 
10.  These  changes  are  the  result  of  important  planning strategies  that  have 
been  in  operation  since  1967  when  the  first  population  programme  was 
outlined.  These  strategies  include  a  vigorous  individual  choice-based 
family  planning  programme,  clear  political  commitment  and  advocacy  for 
integrated  population  management  in general,  and  fertility  reduction  in 
particular, strong donor and NGO  support,  and broad receptivity by various 
public constituencies to population programme rationale. The establishment 
of  National  Council  for  Population  and  Development  (  NCPD)  in  1982  to 
supervise  the  implementation  of  these  strategies  and  the  holding  of  the 
first  population  conference  for  national  leaders  in  1984  constitute  the 
high  water  mark  in  the  Kenya  government's  commitment  to  population 
management. 
- 28  -11.  As  early as  1965,  in Sessional Paper no.  10  of that year,  the crucial link 
between  the  rate  of  population  growth  and  development  had  been 
acknowledged.  The  same  relationship  was  subsequently  explored  in detail 
when  the 5  year  family  planning programme  was  launched between  1975-1979. 
All  of  the  country's  development  plans  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  have,  in 
consequence,  placed  the  population  issue  at  the  centre  of  development 
policy.  Indeed  population  issues  have  become  fully  integrated  into 
development policies, plans, programmes and activities. The primary concern 
of  the government  is to ensure  that  the country's population growth rate 
does  not  outstrip  her  ability  to  generate  and  sustain  its  natural 
resources. 
12.  In this regard,  the government  has  taken important initiatives to address 
critical  issues  in  both  human  and  natural  resource  development.  These 
include  youth  and  adolescent  management,  enhancement  of  the  status  of 
women,  education  and  training,  basic  skills  development,  strengthening 
maternal  and  child health  services  and  improvement  of  public  health  and 
associated infrastructure.  Further,  important policies and  programmes  for 
the sustainable management  of natural resources have been put into place. 
These  include agricultural sector adjustment  operations,  a  programme  for 
the  development  of  the  arid  and  semi-arid  lands,  a  comprehensive 
environmental action plan,  and a vigorous science and technology programme. 
13.  Specifically the  government  has  taken steps to  ensure that virtually all 
school-going  children  are  enrolled  and  that  the  quality  of  education 
continues  to  improve.  The  incorporation  of  technical  education  in  the 
primary  school  curriculum,  in  particular,  has  made  it possible  for  the 
informal  sector  of  the  economy  to participate  fully  in the  reduction  of 
unemployment.  Further,  every effort is being made  to remove all impediments 
(social,  economic and cultural)  to genuine gender equality through,  ~nter 
alia,  ensuring equal  access to education and  employment,  public advocacy, 
and  legislative reform.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  an  important  task force  has 
been set up to examine all laws that discriminate against women  and to make 
appropriate recommendations  to the country's Attorney  General. 
1  4.  Despite these efforts a  number of important constraints still remain.  These 
include  serious  economic  stagnation  and  reduced  donor  support  for 
development  programmes,  an  unusually  high  influx  of  refugees  from 
neighbouring  countries,  a  relatively  high  morbidity  rate  (even  though 
actual  mortality  rates  are  falling)  and  the  threat  of  HIV/AIDS.  Indeed 
HIV/AIDS  which  was  first  diagnosed  in  1984/85  is set  to  claim  up  to  two 
hundred thousand lives in the year 2000.  It will also increase the cost of 
health care.  Real possibilities therefore exist for a  serious set-back in 
the country's current population programme.  Indeed unless concerted efforts 
are  made  to  mobilize  domestic  resources  to  cover  the  shortfalls  due  to 
reduced international assistance,  the modest  gains already achieved could 
be  lost. 
15.  The  government  has  tried to address  some  of  these constraints by  adopting 
a  number  of  strategies.  These  include  the  widespread  introduction  of 
community-based distribution of family planning services which enhances the 
programmes'  capacity to reach more  clients and help eradicate some  socio-
cultural obstacles to  family  planning acceptance.  It has  also formulated 
a national Information, Education and Communication  (IEC)  strategy in which 
specific IEC  gaps are being addressed e.g.  adolescent fertility and  women 
empowerment,  in order to apply relevant messages to appropriate audiences. 
- 29  -National  leaders  population conferences  are  also held  from  time  to  time 
with  the  aim  of  increasing  political  support  to  the  programme.  A  new 
strategy  to  combat  the  AIDS  menace  through  public  education  is  also  in 
force. 
Honourable  members  of  the Committee,  distinguished Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
16.  The  road  ahead  is certainly not  easy.  I  am  confident,  however,  that  we 
shall  succeed,  through  these policies and  programmes,  to ensure  a  decent 
quality of  life for our people into the twenty-first century and beyond. 
Thank  you very  much  for having  invited me. 
- 30  -4.  THE  ENVIRONMENTAL  IMPACT  OF  POPULATION  GROWTH 
FROM  ·FACT  AND  DOCTRINE  TO  SCIENTIFIC  DEBATE 
Professor Dominique  TABUTIN 
Institute of Demography,  Catholic University of Louvain 
SOME  BACKGROUND  DATA  BY  WAY  OF  AN  INTRODUCTION 
For  the  past  forty  years  or  so,  the  world  has  been  going  through  an 
unprecedented period of demographic,  social, economic and environmental change. 
In  the  demographic  field,  the  geographical  distribution  of  the  world's 
population is rapidly changing.  The  population figures for the South are rising 
in  both  absolute  and  relative  terms  whereas,  in  the  North,  they  have  almost 
reached the point of stagnation.  In the economic field the opposite situation 
is  to  be  found,  with  North  America,  Europe  and  Japan  becoming  increasingly 
dominant  and  imposing their  'law'  on the rest of  the world.  With the exception 
of  a  few  of the countries of East Asia,  problems of all kinds continue to build 
up  almost  everywhere  else  in  the  world.  In  the  environmental  field,  the 
situation is alarming both at global  level  and  in many  regions  and countries. 
A  (perhaps  rather  smug)  mood  of  optimism  reigned  during  the  1950s  and  1960s. 
Rostow's  'take-off'  ideology,  based  on  growth  along  Western  lines,  ruled  the 
day..  However,  by  the  end  of  the  1960s,  uncertainty  and  a  certain degree  of 
scepticism had already begun to set in:  the problem of the South's development 
was  not  going to be settled as quickly as had been thought.  In  1972,  the Club 
of  Rome  published its  'worst-case scenario'  which,  even  though  overstated  and 
open to criticism,  made  a  large impact owing to the bleak prospects it held out 
for  the  future.  Development  theories  and  models  continued  to be  put  forward, 
but  the disturbing facts  of  the situation would  not  go  away.  The  1980s  were 
marked  by  a  sense  of  crisis  and  a  mood  of  pessimism,  with  a  world  recession 
between  1980  and  1983,  rising inflation and growing debt burdens,  a  decline in 
living standards and social welfare in many  countries - all of which was  finally 
capped  by  austerity  or  structural  adjustment  policies  (mostly  imposed  by  the 
IMF),  the  long-term  social  impact  of  which  has  yet  to  be  properly  assessed. 
Many  observers saw this as proof of the bankruptcy of the theories and solutions 
put  forward  and of  the total failure of capitalism and central planning - both 
the  free-market  model  and  the  Communist  model  (which  was  soon  to  collapse 
totally).  This despite the fact that some  areas  (East Asia)  were faring better 
than  others  (sub-Saharan  Africa)  and  the  seriousness  of  food,  health  and 
environmental  problems  varied enormously  around  the world. 
Although it would appear paradoxical, it was  against this general background of 
economic and ideological crisis, economic recession and a  recourse to short-term 
or  short-sighted  policies,  that  the  concept  (or  paradigm)  of  sustainable 
development  (striking a  medium-to-long-term balance  between  needs,  population 
size  and  resources)  first  emerged  in  the  1980s.  Terms  such  as  interrelated 
phenomena,  interdependency,  s'ystemic  analysis  and  multi-disciplinarity  now 
became  common  currency.  International  scientific  circles  developed  new 
combinatory  paradigms:  population/development  in  the  1970s, 
population/environment  in  more  recent  times  and  even  population/environment/ 
development. 
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strategies for  action was  brought about  by  a  combination of  two  factors:  the 
pressure of events  and  a  new  view of the world and of science. 
The  events  involved  were  the  limited  success  or  downright  failure  of  the 
policies pursued or recommended  hitherto,  economic  stagnation or recession  in 
some  southern  regions,  growing  problems  with  employment,  education  and  food 
supplies,  appalling crises at both local and regional levels,  a  widening of the 
gap between North and South, etc.  Furthermore,  the world's population continued 
to  grow  rapidly  and  the  prospect  of  a  further  15  to  20  years  of  such  growth 
placed a  formidable constraint on any medium-to-long-term planning,  while a  wide 
range of environmental problems at both global and regional levels were finally 
acknowledged  and given wide  media coverage. 
In the face of this situation, starting in the 1970s,  a  new  view of the problems 
of  the  world  and  of  science  gradually  started  to  gain  ground,  mainly  in 
scientific circles but also  among  international development  agenc~es.  (Could 
this  be  seen as  a  new  ideology?)  this  less evolutionist,  much  more  intricate 
view of  the situation is based on  a  concern for  the future: 
The  world  is finite  (its resources  will  not  last  for  ever),  fragile  and 
complex  (there is constant interaction between the biosphere and Man,  and 
between culture and  Nature). 
The  world  is  one,  but  its  inhabitants  differ  greatly,  with  different 
backgrounds,  different cultures and different circumstances. 
Some  feel that the world is going through a  period of disequilibrium,  while 
others see it as being on the road to self destruction;  however,  all agree 
that Man  is responsible. 
Economic considerations can no longer regulate nor explain everything:  all 
of  society's  problems  (from  fertility  to  soil  degradation)  have  social, 
cultural,  historical and political causes  and effects. 
Irrefutable  theories  and  cast-iron historical  models  do  not  exist or  no 
longer  apply;  there  is  no  longer  any  place  for  easy  solutions.  To 
exaggerate a  little, theorizing has reached a  dead end and the way  forward 
now  lies through pragmatism and cautious action. 
Lastly,  and perhaps most  important of all,  the future is the main concern: 
future generations also have a  right to a  decent life.  The  long-term must 
take precedence over the short-term. 
Which  brings us back to the concept of sustainable development,  defined in the 
Brundtland report as  development  which  meets  the needs  and aspirations  of  the 
present  generation  without  compromising  the  ability of  future  generations  to 
meet  their  own  needs.  However,  and  this is the  crux  of  the  matter,  we  still 
need  to define the objectives and  the needs  and,  above all,  determine  exactly 
how  to  eliminate  poverty  and  thereby  solve  many  of  the  problems  in  the 
developing countries.  The principles of viability, sustainabili  ty, fairness and 
integration  are  central  to  an  approach  based  on  finding  a  balance  between 
available resources  and  environmental  protection and  meeting  not  just today's 
needs but those of future generations as well.  Population size,  the environment 
and  development  must  all  be  taken  into  account  in  medium- and  long-term 
planning. 
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of  which  will  remain  on  the  agenda  for  a  long  time  to  come.  The  age-old 
equilibrium between Man  and Nature has now  been broken by environmental stresses 
leading  to  a  deterioration of  marine,  aquatic or  terrestrial  ecosystems,  air 
pollution,  the destruction of flora and fauna and so on.  At  the same time,  over 
the  past  30  to  40  years,  there  has  been  unprecedented  growth  in  the  world's 
population,  particularly in the South.  This  trend will  continue  for at least 
another thirty years. 
Now  population  growth  (in  other  words,  the  southern  hemisphere,  given  that 
population  growth  is  almost  nil  in  the  North)  is  often  accused  of  being 
responsible for all our problems.  However,  is the situation really that simple, 
and is the relationship that direct,  that simplistic?  How  much  responsibility 
should  the  North,  as  opposed  to  the  South,  take  for  the  main  global  problems 
(ozone,  co2,  etc.)?  How  will  this ratio stand in the  future?  Can  population 
growth  always  be  said to  be  the primary  or only cause of  problems at regional 
and  local  levels? 
We  are  now  entering an  area  in which  politics,  ideology  and  science start  to 
overlap and often to clash.  Many  conflicting views  have been put  forward both 
orally and in print.  We  shall first briefly run over the main demographic  and 
environmental  issues  before  going  on  to  examine  the  three  main  doctrines  (or 
ideologies)  and  what  the  scientists do  or  do  not  know  about  the  relationship 
between population growth  and  the environment. 
A BRIEF  REVIEW  OF  THE  FACTS  AND  THE  ISSUES  AT  STAKE 
Generally speaking,  we  have a  fairly good understanding of the basic situation, 
which is reasonably well documented.  However,  many  uncertainties still remain, 
particularly with regard to  how  the situation will  develop  in the future.  We 
will  now  have  a  brief  look at some  of  the problems. 
A - Population 
Uncertainty about the long-term situation 
Although  demography  is  a  reliable  science  when  it  comes  to  medi  urn-range 
forecasts  (let  us  say  10  to  15  years  hence)  it becomes  less  and  less  so  the 
further  one  looks  into  the  future.  How  is  one  to  determine  precisely  the 
fertility rates by  country  and  by  region  in 2010,  2020  or  2030?  Demographers 
always  work  on  the basis of  three scenarios but often,  only  the  mean  estimate 
is  taken  into  account.  None  the  less,  there  is  a  wide  variance  between  the 
upper  and  lower values.  For  instance,  according to which  estimate you  choose 
to  believe,  the  world's  population  will  grow  or  shrink  by  nearly  2  billion 
inhabitants by  the year 2025  - a  total variance of nearly 23%,  due mainly to the 
unpredictability of fertility rates in the southern hemisphere,  particularly in 
Africa and  'pivotal'  countries such as  China  and  India. 
Estimates have been revised upwards 
The  world's  population  has  risen  from  2.5  billion  in  around  1950  to 
approximately 5.4 billion people  (77%  of  whom  live in the southern hemisphere) 
today.  Within 10  years time,  at the beginning of the 21st century, it will have 
risen  to  6.4  billion,  representing  a  mean  (undisputed)  growth  rate  of 
approximately 100  million people per year.  The still quite recent forecast that 
- 33  -the population would stabilize at 10  billion in 2075  has had to be revised:  it 
is now  thought  that  this level will be  reached  in 2050.  The  latest theory is 
that growth will finally tail off at the end of the 21st century,  at which point 
the world's population will stand at between  12  and  13  billion.  However,  even 
the  wildest  estimates  as  to  the  numbers  and  the  timescale  involved  seem 
possible. 
One  thing  is certain:  demographic  transition has  started,  but  growth  rates 
remain high. 
In the North,  growth rates are now  very low  and in some cases actually negative. 
Most  (95%  or  so)  of  the  world's  future  population  growth  will  occur  in  the 
developing  countries:  for  example,  between  1990  and  2025  the  population  of 
southern Asia is likely to grow  from  1.2 to 2.2 billion,  that of  Latin America 
from  450  to 760  million and that of Africa  from  650  million to 1.6 billion.  An 
unprecedented  redistribution  of  the  world's  population  is  currently  taking 
place. 
At  the same  time however,  regional disparities are becoming increasingly acute: 
in addition to  the  obvious  gap  between  North  and  South,  there are differences 
between  regions  and  between  individual  countries  within  these  regions. 
Disparities  in  the  rate  of  decline  and  fertility  and  mortality ·levels  are 
becoming  more  and  more  pronounced.  Population  growth is slowing  down  almost 
everywhere  (except  in sub-Saharan Africa),  but still stands at an  annual  rate 
of  1.3%  ~n East  Asia,  2.1%  in Latin America,  2.3%  in southern Asia  and  nearly 
3%  in  Africa.  The  differences  are  even  more  pronounced  at  national  level. 
Every society has its own  demographic  patterns,  its own  transition models  and 
its  own  reproductive  patterns,  and  adjusts  as  best  it can  to  its  economic, 
social or physical environment;  a  wide variety of responses may  be made  to any 
new  situation.  This  important  factor  must  be  taken  into account  ±f  one is to 
understand  why  some  regions  or  societies  are  'ahead  of'  or  'lagging  behind' 
others.  When  it comes  to  demography,  as  in  other  areas,  one  can  no  longer 
afford to treat  the Third World  (or  the  'South')  as a  single entity. 
Some  of  the direct results:  youth and population density 
Following  a  general  decline  in fertility rates,  the  world  as  a  whole  has  now 
embarked  upon  an  irreversible  ageing  process  which,  although  already  well 
advanced in the North,  is only in its very early stages elsewhere.  Throughout 
the South  populations are extremely young:  the average age in the Third World 
as  a  whole  is  21  (as opposed to  34  in the North).  Only  4.5%  of  the population 
is over 65  years of age,  with 35%  being under 15.  Because of the speed at which 
it is likely to take place and the number of people concerned,  the ageing of the 
population in the South  will be a  major concern in  the 21st century. 
Furthermore,  in some  countries  and  regions population growth rates of  between 
2  and  3%  per year are leading to a  totally unprecedented increase in population 
density.  By  2025  Bangladesh will have over 1500  inhabitants/km2,  Korea  600  and 
Vietnam 320.  Rwanda  and Burundi will be coping with 750  and 500  inhabitants/km2 
respectively.  Many  observers  feel  that  these  countries'  ecosystems  will  be 
unable  to sustain such population levels. 
Major population movements:  the drift from  the land and urbanization 
Although  hardly  new  phenomena,  the  drift  from  the  land  and  urbanization  are 
still very much  with us,  particularly in the South.  In the North,  urbanization 
- 34  -will continue at a  slow pace in the future.  Elsewhere its progress will be much 
faster,  with the proportion of the population living in towns rising from  34  to 
57%  over the next  30  years.  Should these forecasts prove correct,  by  the year 
2025  there  will  be  some  2. 7  billion  more  town  dwellers  in  the  developing 
countries and  25  towns  with over  10  million inhabitants. 
Internal migratory flows are directed mainly towards towns  - most often towards 
capitals - resulting in some  regions becoming drained of young people,  who  leave 
in  search  of  jobs  or  a  new  lifestyle.  This  can  lead  to  an  ageing  of  the 
population  in  rural  areas  and  even  to  a  fall  in  agricultural  output. 
International  migration represents another  way  out.  Almost  by definition,  the 
extent  of  this  phenomenon  is  unclear,  but  migratory  pressures  on  northern 
countries  are  clearly  strong  and  will  remain  so  in  the  future.  Refugee 
movements  are  another  form  of  migration,  caused  by  civil  war,  political 
repression or natural disasters.  Estimates point to nearly 18  million refugees 
in the world,  approximately half of  them  in Africa. 
B  - The  environment 
Inadequate statistical data 
In  the  environmental  field,  the  statistical data available  are  inadequate  in 
terms of both quantity and quality - so much  so that,  in comparison,  demography 
looks like a  precise science.  Although over the past ten years an increasingly 
large  body  of  data  has  become  available  on  climatology,  the  atmosphere, 
desertification and so on,  when  one gets down  to national or regional level the 
picture  becomes  much  less clear and  estimates  much  less reliable.  Since  the 
environment became  a  matter of concern only recently,  few  regions or countries 
have adequate information-gathering bodies or the ne~essary resources.  Much  of 
the information is out of date and local in scope.  Most  of the existing figures 
must  therefore be  seen as  rough estimates  and  handled with care. 
The  main problems at global level 
Scientists  first  raised  the  alarm  in  the  19 60s.  Environmentalists  star  ted 
mobilizing  in  the  1970s  and  governments  followed  suit  in  the  1980s.  The 
Stockholm Conference of  1972  paved the way  for the Rio Conference held in 1992. 
The  seriousness of  the problems  cannot be  ignored,  despite the fact  that broad 
agreement  has yet to be reached as  to their extent,  the timescale involved and 
the levels at which  the process will  become  irreversible. 
Damage  is being caused to the atmosphere not  just over towns but all around the 
world:  over-production and excessive use of CFCs  are depleting the ozone in the 
atmosphere,  thereby  lessening  the  earth's  protection  against  ultraviolet 
radiation.  At  the same  time,  carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere are rising 
(greenhouse effect) which,  in the medium-to-long-term,  will lead to an increase 
in  the  average  temperature  on  earth,  a  rise  in  sea  levels  and  a  change  in 
climate  patterns.  The  rise  in  co2  emissions  is  caused  by  the  increasingly 
widespread use of coal and petroleum products in industry and society as a  whole 
(e.g.  the motor car).  Modern  farming methods  have  led to  the intensive use of 
nitrates- a  well-known pollutant.  The  sea itself,  once considered an infinite 
resource,  must  now  be  protected  against  oil  spillages  and  other  forms  of 
pollution.  The  air  in  large  towns  in  both  North  and  South  is  polluted  and 
toxic.  Acid rain is destroying the West's forests.  Owing  to its production and 
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the South is no  longer totally blameless.  We  shall come  back  to this later. 
Deforestation 
Forests,  which  are  of  considerable  importance  to  the  world's  ecosystem  and 
genetic heritage  as  well  to  both  national  and  local  economies,  are  gradually 
disappearing.  Estimates vary but,  according to the  FAO  (1985),  approximately 
150  000  km2  (five  times  the  surface  area  of  Belgium)  of  the  world's  forests 
(including  approximately  100  000  km2  of  tropical  forest  land)  disappear  each 
year.  Reforestation takes place at a  much  slower rate:  for every  10  hectares 
of  forest  land  cleared  in  the  southern  hemisphere,  only  about  three  are 
replanted.  Mankind is destroying its own  forests through a  need for new  grazing 
or arable land,  for  wood  for commercial or private use,  by accident or through 
clumsiness  (forest fires).  Governments  (e.g.  Brazil,  in the Amazon)  sometimes 
give tacit or open support  to such activities.  It has  been estimated that,  at 
the  current  rate,  approximately  35%  of  the  forest  land  which  existed  in  the 
southern hemisphere in around  1985 will have disappeared by the year 2000.  The 
situation  of  course  varies  from  place  to  place:  the  annual  rate  of 
deforestation during the  1980s  ranged  from  below  1%  (in forty or so countries) 
to over  5%  in the  Ivory Coast,  Costa Rica  and Nigeria. 
Firewood 
Firewood  remains  the  basic  source  of  energy  for  one  quarter  of  the  world's 
population.  In around 1980,  it accounted for  21%  of overall energy consumption 
in  the  developing  countries  (18%  in  Latin  America,  58%  in  Africa  and  17%  in 
Asia);  however,  it accounted  for  over  70%  in  26  countries.  The  shortage  of 
this source of energy is a  very real daily concern for over two billion people. 
Deforestation  has  reached  such  a  level  both  in  the  countryside  and  on  the 
outskirts of  towns  that this shortage is growing steadily worse.  As  a  result, 
wood  prices  in  towns  are  rising  sharply,  women  and  children  are  becoming 
increasingly overworked and the already difficult living conditions of the poor 
and  country  dwellers  in  particular  are  continuing  to  deteriorate.  Although 
there is also a  shortage of firewood in Latin America,  the areas hardest hit are 
Asia  and Africa,  where  the situation is particularly serious. 
Conventional energy sources  (oil,  gas and coal)  are vital to the development of 
industry,  transport and urban areas.  However,  owing to the price of such energy 
sources  and  to  distribution  difficulties,  firewood  will  long  continue  to  be 
necessary  to  the  survival  of  many  inhabitants  of  the  southern  hemisphere. 
Generally speaking,  reforestation policies have had only a  limited impact and, 
in view of the installation costs and the technology required,  renewable energy 
sources  (solar,  wind)  continue to be little used.  In the view of J.  Clement and 
S.  Strasfogel  (1986),  no technical,  economic or social measures will suffice to 
reduce significantly the pressure on forests and the demand  for wood  by the end 
of  the century:  wood  will remain an irreplaceable energy source. 
The  land under threat:  from degradation to desertification 
The  declining  productivity of  much  of  the  agricultural  land  in  the  South  is 
without  a  doubt  one  of  the  major  challenges  facing  the  world  in  the  closing 
years  of  this  century.  Through  over-farming,  a  lack of  care  (e.g.  intensive 
deforestation)  or poor  management  (ineffective  irrigation systems),  we  are in 
the process of destroying a  fragile balance which  took a  long time to develop. 
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decline  and  erosion  (by  wind  or  water)  will  set  in,  leading  gradually  to 
desertification.  Whenever  land  is irrigated without  proper drainage  systems, 
soil saturation,  alkalization or salting takes place.  By  failing to manage  the 
environment  in  a  responsible  manner,  Man  becomes  both  the  instigator and  the 
victim of a  process which can lead to malnutrition,  food shortages or migration 
('environmental  refugees'). 
This process is of concern  to the world as a  whole,  even though it is far more 
advanced  in some  regions  than  in others  and  estimates of  its extent vary  from 
source to source.  According to A.  Grainger  (1990),  200  000  km2  of  land become 
barren every  year  and  6-7  million  km2  are  affected  by  desertification.  Most 
important  of  all,  this  process  directly  threatens  500-600  million  people. 
Africa is particularly threatened:  60  of the  140  million people living in areas 
in which desertification is rapidly taking hold are African.  Tropical forests 
are  shrinking,  brushwood  is  gradually  disappearing  in  savanna  land  and  arid 
areas are spreading rapidly.  According to the UNEP  ( 1985),  the Sahel is turning 
into a  desert,  savanna  land into a  Sahel-type environment and  the forests  into 
savanna  land. 
Water:  quantity and quality 
Water supplies are a  daily worry for over half of  the world's population.  Even 
in  the  temperate  countries  of  the North,  there  is  now  talk of  possible water 
shortages within the next 25  years,  together with poor management,  ground water 
pollution, overconsumption and price considerations.  The expert view ( J.  Theys, 
1987)  is  that  cheap,  easily-accessible  water  will  gradually  become  the 
exception.  But  what  of  the  Third  World?  Already,  30-40%  of  the  world's 
population live  in areas affected by  water  shortages.  This  figure could rise 
to  50%  by  the  beginning  of  the  next  century.  Three-fifths  of  Third  World 
households have no access to drinking water supplies.  This  problem,  which  was 
mainly  restricted  to  rural  areas  20  or  so  years  ago,  now  also  affects  urban 
areas  owing  to  r1s1ng  domestic,  agricultural  and  industrial  demand. 
Furthermore,  it is not  just a  problem  of  quantity,  but  also of  quality.  Its 
seriousness  depends  on  climate,  pedological  considerations,  the  reserves 
available,  the level of  development  and  the policies implemented.  The  problem 
is particularly acute in regions  such as North Africa,  the Middle East and  the 
Sahel. 
Urban problems 
The unprecedented urban expansion now  taking place is already creating enormous 
problems  in  the  South,  with  urban  sprawl,  the  ruralization  of  towns,  the 
pauperization of  increasingly large sections of  the population,  the  growth  of 
shanty  towns  and  generally difficult  living conditions.  Towns  are still seen 
as  a  source  of  hope  but  can  no  longer  really be  seen  as  a  source  of  jobs  and 
material  comfort  or at least much  less so than before. 
There  is  a  growing  discrepancy  between  the  needs  of  the  population  and  the 
services  and  infrastructures  provided  by  local  councils  (owing  to  inadequate 
financial  and  human  resources)  and  living conditions  and  the  environment  are 
steadily deteriorating to varying degrees almost everywhere,  with increasingly 
scarce  low-cost  housing,  property  speculation,  unreliable  drinking  water 
suppl.ies,  inadequate  electricity distribution,  over-stretched  and  often  out-
dated.·sewage  networks,  unregulated  refuse  collection  and  storage,  inadequate 
- 37  -social  and  health  provision  in  outlying  areas,  a  shortage  of  transport 
facilities and  schools,  and so on. 
THE  THREE  MAIN  DOCTRINAL  (OR 
1 IDEOLOGICAL 
1 
)  APPROACHES 
No  one  branch of science can  lay claim to the  environment,  which is a  sort of 
'disciplinary  crossroads'  at  which  empirical  sciences  (biology,  agronomy, 
physics,  etc.)  and  social  sciences  (economics,  sociology,  demography,  etc.) 
intersect  or  should  in  principle  intersect.  In  systemic  terms,  all 
development  processes  are  the  result  of  interrelations  between  four  main 
factors:  population,  technology,  socio-political  organization  and  the 
environment  (space,  resources,  ecosystems,  etc.). 
Populat~on 
/ 
structure::. 
~ 
and  dynamics 
Soc~al and  Development  Technology  polit~cal  "> 
organ~zat~on 
~I 
Env~ronment 1/ 
This  general  situation  obviously  adds  to  the  complexity  of  the  mechanisms 
involved and of  the overall approach to adopt  to the causes  and effects of  the 
deterioration of  a  given environment. 
However,  here  we  shall  concentrate  on  the relationship between population  and 
the  environment,  an  area  in  which  there  are  three  main  doctrinal  approaches. 
The  traditional  dichotomy  of  approach  used  in  respect  of  population  and 
development applies once again in this context.  Basically speaking,  on the one 
hand population growth is seen as being responsible for all the worlds problems 
and,  on the other,  as being almost blameless. Rather than being just an academic 
debate,  this is a  fully-fledged  ideological conflict.  While  the positions of 
the  various  camps  were  clearly  staked  out  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  the 
differences  between  them  are now  less pronounced.  However,  the basic  problem 
remains  the  same. 
The hardline neo-Mal  thus  ian approach:  now  losing momentum 
At  a  time  when  doubt  is setting in as  to  the planet's  future  ability to  meet 
humanity's  needs  Malthus's  theory  about  the  negative  impact  which  population 
growth  has  on  agricultural  output  has  been  'logically'  extended  to  cover  the 
environment.  The  world  is  finite  and  the  earth's  physical  and  biological 
- 38  -capacities  therefore  constitute  the  ultimate  limits  on  population  growth  and 
socio-economic  change.  In  other  words,  population  growth  in  the  southern 
hemisphere {since growth is almost nil in the North)  is causing all the problems 
and is a  threat to the future of  the world as  a  whole.  The  world's population 
is growing at such a  rate and is going to be so large that it is neither likely 
nor  possible  that  the  necessary  adjustments  will  be  made  over  the  next  20-30 
years.  F.  Ramade  ( 1987),  an  ecologist  who  has  espoused  the  neo-Mal thus  ian 
cause,  writes  that  the major disaster threatening mankind  and causing most  of 
its present or potential ills is of an intrinsic nature,  in that it stems  from 
anarchic reproduction patterns which are leading to an exponential growth in the 
number  of people in the world. 
According  to  this  viewpoint,  which  finds  support  among  many  agronomists, 
biologists  and ecologists,  we  have  already  gone  beyond  the point at which  the 
world's  ecosystems  are  capable  of  regenerating  themselves,  are  now  in  the 
process  of  running  down  its biological  resources  and  have  almost  reached  the 
point of non-return.  On  the basis of this pessimistic view of  things,  a  firm, 
effective  policy  of  birth-control  in  the  Third  World  must  be  seen  as  the 
priority, if not the only way  of avoiding disaster.  This rather simplistic view 
is still widely  held.  It formed  the basis or  the North's population policies 
for  the  South  in the  1960s  and  1970s  and  has  given rise to vertical,  isolated 
family planning systems which have sometimes been taken to extremes and,  in many 
cases,  have  had little or no  effect. 
Qualified neo-Malthusianism:  now  widespread 
Since the end of the 1970s,  a  less radical,  more  reasoned approach has gradually 
been gaining ground,  based on the premise that demographic pressure is not  the 
direct cause of environmental problems,  although it does serve to amplify them. 
It effectively acts as  a  permanent  brake  on  any  form  of  development,  progress 
or change.  The  main underlying factor is poverty,  which is both a  cause and an 
effect  of  high  fertility  rates.  Population  growth  is  seen  simply  as  an 
immediate  cause  which  aggravates  the  overall  situation and  must  therefore  be 
acted upon  swiftly in order to prevent any  further deterioration. 
This  represents  something  of  a  break  with  simplistic  theories,  rudimentary 
universal  formulas  (contraception)  and  quick  solutions.  None  the  less,  the 
proponents  of  this approach still feel  that,  with a  view  to both  limiting the 
damage  and preparing for  a  better future,  swift,  vigorous action must  be  taken 
to control fertility,  which is the root cause of current and  future population 
growth. 
Anti-Malthusianism:  a  minority view 
The  apparent  optimism  of  this  third  approach  contrasts  with  the  pess~m~sm 
underlying  the  others.  The  basic  precept  is  that  mankind  has  always  shown 
itself capable of  facing  up  to external  threats  and will  be  able to solve the 
problems  of  tomorrow  in the  same  way  as  those of  today,  having demonstrated  a 
remarkable  capacity  to  adapt  and  innovate.  Population  growth  is  a  wholly 
secondary factor which may  in some  cases even be favourable,  and the true causes 
are to be  sought elsewhere:  in poverty,  inequalities,  unsuitable technologies, 
agricultural policy (priority given to cash crops),  land ownership,  the bias in 
favour of towns,  war,  political regimes,  etc.  Proponents point out that family 
planning  is not  the sole priority,  and  this approach  may  be  used  to justify a 
policy of non-intervention in respect of  fertility rates. 
- 39  -The  anti-Malthusianist  camp  embraces  views  such  as  the hardline populationist 
theory,  supported by J.  Simon  (1981)  among  others,  that there is no  such thing 
as  a  population  problem,  almost  going  so  far  as  to  deny  the  existence  of 
environmental problems.  The larger the population,  the greater its capacity for 
invention and  technological  innovation.  Population  growth  in the Third  World 
may  in  the  long  term  help  to  promote  economic  development,  although  it is 
recognized as being a  constraint in the short  term.  Then  there is the  famous 
Boserup  theory  (1965,  1981)  that  population  growth  acts  as  a  stimulant,  or 
rather a  necessary precondition,  for agricultural progress.  This view tends to 
stand the previous relationship on  its head,  considering population growth  to 
be  responsible for  technological progress. 
Given  that  it  sees  population  growth  as  having  a  positive  role,  the 
anti-Malthusian  approach  perhaps  reflects  past  developments  in  Western  or 
temperate  countries,  but  does  not  appear  to  be  applicable  to  the  whole  of 
today's world in general.  None  the less,  the arguments put  forward have served 
to  relativize  the  negative  and  sometimes  over-pessimistic  view  taken  of 
population growth in whatever  form,  to stimulate new  debate on  the subject and 
to  show  conclusively that the real situation is more  complex  than many  people 
have  long felt it to be. 
A SCIENTIFIC  VIEW  OF  THE  ROLE  PLAYED  BY  POPULATION  GROWTH 
Environmental problems occur at various levels  (global,  regional and local)  and 
different approaches are therefore required. 
Wealth and poverty,  the root causes of global environmental problems 
It is now  generally accepted that global environmental degradation has two basic 
causes:  the  (dominant)  economic  growth  model  adopted by  the countries  of  the 
northern  hemisphere  (and  a  few  isolated  areas  in  the  South)  and  the  under-
development  and poverty of much  of  the southern hemisphere.  While  the rich of 
this  world  (approximately  one  billion people)  produce,  transport  and  consume 
most  of  the world's energy and are mainly responsible for the current problems 
of sea pollution,  ozone depletion,  acidification and warming of the atmosphere, 
the dispossessed  (one  to one and a  half billion)  clear trees,  damage  the  land, 
grow crops  (such as rice)  which contribute towards the greenhouse effect and set 
up  'dirty'  industries  (which  the  North  no  longer  wants)  simply  to  be  able  to 
survive  from  day  to  day.  In  short,  one  half  of  the  world  sacrifices 
sustainability or  the  'long-term'  for  maximum  profit and pleasure  today  while 
the other half is obliged to over-utilize the natural resources available simply 
to stay alive.  As  the Brundtland report puts it, poverty is to a  large extent 
both an effect and a  cause of environmental degradation.  When  this is combined 
with a  high population growth rate,  one may  well agree with the assessment made 
by  the  UNFPA  in  1990  that,  in  developed  and  developing  countries  alike,  the 
larger the population,  the more  pollution there will be. 
However,  we  must  not  be  too  hasty  in  blaming  what  is  simply  an  immediate 
contributory  factor  {population  growth)  for  a  situation caused  by  underlying 
factors such as the prevailing economic system, poverty and inequalities between 
North  and  South. 
In  our  view,  quantitative studies  have  yet  to  confirm  the  oft-made  assertion 
that  the  final  destruction of  the world's  environment  depends  solely upon its 
- 40  -total  number  of  inhabitants  and  that  population growth  is the  prime  cause  of 
damage  today  and will  continue to be  so  in the future,  even if growth  were  to 
slow  down.  The  research  carried  out  by  B.  Commoner  on  the  USA  and  the 
developing  countries  during  the  1970s  and  1980s  highlighted  the  central  role 
played  by  technology.  However,  the  debate  is  far  from  over.  For  example, 
P.  Harrison  (1992)  found that population growth  (and thus the South)  had a  much 
more  important  role  in the  process  although  the  extent  of  its responsibility 
varied,  that  complex  interrelations  were  at work  and  that  the  available data 
were  often  incomplete  or  insufficiently  reliable.  Conversely,  an  even  more 
recent study on atmospheric warming  (F.  Bartiaux and J.  P.  van Ypersele,  1993) 
paints a  very detailed picture of how  in the industrialized nations between 1950 
and  j990,  per capita co2  emissions  combined  with population growth  had  a  much 
larger  impact  than  population  growth  in  the  countries  of  the  southern 
hemisphere. 
None  the less, when  one takes into account the certainty that the poorer nations 
will  in future  account  for  a  growing share of  the world's population,  and  the 
probability  that  income  and  consumption  levels  will  increase  throughout  the 
South (at least in absolute terms), it is clear that over the next,40 y~ars, the 
poorer nations will  take an increasingly large share of the responsibility for 
global  environmental  degradation.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  southern 
hemisphere is and will continue to be solely responsible for global degradation 
- far  from  it - but  the combination of population growth and rising production 
and  consumption  levels  in  this  part  of  the  world  will  result  in  a  more  even 
sharing of  the responsibility.  That  is,  unless  the  technologies used  and  the 
way  of life in these countries change radically;  unless they move  away  from the 
Western model.  However,  the South has neither the desire nor the technical and 
financial  resources  to  do  so.  'Clean'  or  new  technologies  are  expensive  and 
short-term needs  (such as debt servicing) are compelling.  While,  in approximate 
terms,  the South currently accounts for  30%  of global environmental damage  and 
the North for  70%,  by  the year 2050  the ratio will in all probability be 50/50. 
A few  recent estimates are given in the table below. 
- 41  -The  South's respons'ibili  ty for global environmental  degradation 
Authors  over recent years  in the future 
B.  Commoner(1988)  From  25  to  35% 
depending  on  the  problem 
2025:  35%  with no 
P.  Shaw(1988)  25%  change  in income 
levels 
51%  with a  3% 
growth in per 
P.  Harrison ( 1991 )  22%  for  CFCs  capita  income 
62%  for  C02 (! ) 
Population Council(1991)  36%  for  C02 
R. 
A. 
1765-1990  2100:  55% 
Warrick  and  27%  for  the  greenhouse effect 
Rahman(1992)  22%  for deforestation 
16%  for  C02 
In  a  forward  study  covering  the  period  up  to  the  year  2100,  the  Population 
Council  (1991)  estimated the relative contributions of  North  and  South  to the 
foreseeable overall increase in co2  emissions.  Production and consumption will 
account  for  two-thirds of  the overall  increase and  population growth  for  only 
one-third;  the South will account for  60%  (29%  stemming  from population growth 
and  31%  from  production)  and the North  for  40%  (34%  stemming  from  production). 
In per capita terms,  by  the year  2100  the  North will still be  producing three 
times as much  C02  as the South,  but will account for only  46%  of total emissions 
as  against  65%  in  1985. 
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the increase in co2  emissions between  1985  and 2100  (%) 
Region  Population growth  Production/ 
consumption  Total 
South  29  31  60 
North  6  34  40 
Total  35  65  100 
Source:  Population Council(1991) 
The  production systems  and  lifestyles we  choose  to adopt  and  the  way  in which 
we  treat Nature will of course affect the biosphere,  but the full extent of the 
damage  caused will also depend  on  how  many  people attain a  decent  standard of 
living and how  many  remain poor.  In the North,  population growth is sluggish, 
while  the  financial  and  technical  resources  are  available  for  enormous 
improvements to be made  in the field of  technology.  In the South one could,  as 
has been widely recommended,  make  it a  priority to limit the damage  by reducing 
population and poverty levels  (Malthus's approach),  by  tackling the problem of 
anarchic  urbanization,  by  implementing  properly  targeted  local  environmental 
protection programmes  and so on.  However,  this would  be  to ignore the failure 
(or  at  least  the  very  limited  success)  of  many  of  the  environmental  and 
population measures  implemented during the  1970s  and  1980s,  the basic inertia 
of  all  population  groups  and  all  the  various  other  forms  of  resistance  to 
change.  Above  all,  we  would  merely  be  treating  the  symptoms  which,  although 
necessary,  would  not  remove  the  underlying  causes:  under-development  and 
regional inequalities which,  for a large section of the world's population,  will 
continue  to  grow  over  the  next  few  decades.  One  can  only  reduce  the 
environmental impact of poverty by first tackling the problem of poverty itself, 
and high fertility rates are simply one aspect of this problem.  In the absence 
of  genuine  social  and  economic  development,  no  population policy is likely to 
have  more  than a  minimal,  gradual  impact. 
Regional and local problems:  population growth is only one part of the equation 
While  theory,  doctrines  and  general  concepts  are  of  course  necessary,  they 
always  over-simplify  the  real  situation,  skimming  over  the  differences  which 
exist at  regional,  local  or  community  levels.  Reality  is  complex  and  multi-
faceted.  In  1989,  G.  Gallopin et al.  wrote that any  action taken to influence 
ecosystems is dependent on the manner  in which  the social system works,  on  how 
human  beings  perceive  the  environment  and  the  value  which  they  attach to it. 
Furthermore,  in  terms  of  demographic  patterns  (fertility,  migration  and 
marriage) ,  individuals  rarely  act  by  whim  or  chance.  There  is  therefore  a 
certain logic or rational  pattern to the behaviour of any society,  even one in 
which the population,  food or environmental situation is unstable.  Case studies 
on  carefully-targeted  problems,  regions  or  societies  allow  one  to  go  beyond 
- 43  -outward  appearances  and  trace  back  the  real  mechanisms  behind  environmental 
degradation.  Such  studies  often  contradict  the  peremptory  judgments  of  the 
past. 
An  increasingly large number of studies support the view that population growth 
is not in all cases and at all  times  the principal factor behind environmental 
degradation or foreseeable  shortages of certain resources. 
There can be no disputing the fact that population pressure is a  problem in much 
of  the  Third  World  and  in Africa  in particular,  or  that  it often  aggravates 
existing problems and may  sometimes  jeopardizes future prospects.  The  size of 
the population in some  towns  (Mexico City, Cairo,  Sao Paulo,  Algiers,  New  Delhi, 
etc.)  clearly  leads directly to unacceptably high pollution levels,  declining 
health standards  in some  cases,  and unacceptable living conditions for  most  of 
the  population.  But  how  did this situation come  about?  Although it is  true 
that,  in ecologically and climatically vulnerable areas  (such  as  the  Sahel  or 
the  grasslands  of  the  Maghreb)  and  already  densely-populated  areas  (Rwanda, 
Burundi,  the Kivu  region in Zaire,  etc.) population pressure greatly magnifies 
all the other problems,  damage  also occurs in less densely-populated areas,  in 
some  of  which  space is still available. 
Are  water or soil salting problems,  currently a  concern in the Maghreb  and the 
Middle  East,  solely due  to population growth?  Could  soil degradation  and  the 
process of desertification not also be due to poor rural development strategies 
(for example,  the priority given  to cash crops),  or perhaps  to errors at both 
individual  and  collective  levels  (farmers  and  breeders  with  a  'subsistence' 
mentality;  governments  keeping  prices  low  for  town  dwellers;  action  by 
international creditors or agri-food multinationals)?  Might  the rapid pace of 
deforestation not,  in many  cases,  be  put  down  to  government  policy  or  to  the 
strategies adopted by  some  private entrepreneurs? 
Lastly,  mention must also be  made  of  the wars,  rebellions and ethnic conflicts 
which have become  increasingly common  over the past 30  years,  all of which have 
taken  their toll  in lives  and  damage  to the  environment.  It is a  long list, 
from  Vietnam  to  the  Lebanon,  Iran-Iraq,  Ethiopia-Eritrea,  Afghanistan,  Iraq-
Kuwait  and,  more recently,  the former Yugoslavia and Burundi.  Over the past 20 
years Africa in particular has been beset by  coups d'etat,  ethnic or political 
wars  and  repression  (Sudan,  Ethiopia,  Uganda,  Mozambique,  Angola,  Liberia, 
etc.).  All such events have some  impact on the environment,  destabilizing rural 
communities,  disrupting  agricultural  production,  nullifying  the  effects  of 
development projects and  forcing hundreds  of  thousands of  people to flee.  The 
major natural  disasters which  occur regularly in various countries or regions 
of  the southern hemisphere  should,  of course,  also be  taken into account. 
- 44  -CONCLUSION 
Population growth is a  very real factor in both global and regional problems but 
must  be  considered  together  with  other  causes  stemming  from  technological 
options,  production  and  consumption  patterns  and  national  or  international 
political strategy.  The  impact of population  growth  must  therefore be seen as 
relative in both  time  and  space.  This has  always  been  true  and  will  continue 
to  be  so.  None  the  less,  gaps  still  remain  in  our  understanding  of  the 
relationship  between  population  and  the  environment,  particularly  at  local 
level. 
Rather  than  waiting  for  the  current  controversies  and  uncertainties  in 
scientific circles  to  come  to  an  end  (if  they  ever  do),  we  must  take  swift 
action at both demographic  and environmental  levels.  Exactly where  and how  is 
another matter.  However,  two  almost  obvious points must  be  made: 
1 .  Given the complexity and disparity of the various problems and the contexts 
in which they occur,  any national policy covering population (ranging from 
fertility to  geographical  dispersion)  and  the  environment  (from  regional 
to local levels) must take account of the cultural particularities and real 
needs of each population group.  All those directly concerned  (communi ties, 
elected representatives and government)  must  therefore be  involved in its 
formulation.  Despite  the  urgency  of  the  situation,  however,  decision-
making  powers  must  not  be  concentrated solely  in  the  hands  of  national, 
foreign or international technocracies. 
2.  Given  the  present  economic  situation  in  many  countries  in  the  southern 
hemisphere and  the prospects for the future,  such sustainable development 
policies,  which  take  into  account  population  and  environmental 
considerations,  must  receive  long-term  financial  support  from  the 
international  community  and  the  North.  The  whole  future  of  our  planet 
depends  upon it. 
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- 46  -5.  DEMOGRAPHY  AND  DEVELOPMENT  FROM  THE  ECONOMIC  POINT  OF  VIEW 
Professor TAPINOS,  Institute of Political Science,  Paris 
I  am  sorry to have missed the talk by  my  colleague Mr  Tabutin,  which would have 
allowed  me  to  get  my  bearings.  I  should  mention  that,  being unfamiliar  with 
this  type of  event,  I  am  not quite sure  what  to expect of  my  listeners,  and  I 
hope  that  at  the  end  of  my  talk  I  shall  have  the  opportunity  to  answer  your 
questions as best  I  can.  What  I  intend to do  in the twenty minutes allowed me 
is to give a  general overview of the issue.  If I  have understood correctly,  and 
to  judge by  the names  of  the other contributors,  you  would  like me  to  look at 
demography  and  development  issues  from  an  economic  point of  view.  I  shall be 
dealing with three points. 
First I  shall look at the nature of the  issue;  secondly  I  shall try to see,  by 
assessing  briefly  what  has  been  done  in  recent  years,  what  are  the  main 
'mistakes'  or misapprehensions  which  need to be  remedied if progress  is to be 
made;  thirdly,  I  should  like  to  deal  more  specifically  with  one  subject  -
international  migration -,  about  which  I  would  like  to  make  some  specific 
suggestions;  I  shall  conclude  with  two  or  three  remarks  of  a  more  political 
nature. 
On  the first  point,  it is quite clear  - it is  superfluous  or  commonplace  to 
state - that a  demographic problem exists in the Third World.  But,  having said 
that,  it is  important  to be  accurate  about  its impact  on  development  and,  in 
particular,  not to blame population growth for all these countries'  development 
problems.  And  it is important,  consequently,  not to assume  that the hoped-for 
drop  in  population  growth  will  automatically  solve  development  problems.  I 
believe  that  this  is absolutely essential.  If  we  take  each  problem  in turn, 
whether it be poverty,  or famine,  or the environment,  there is of course a  link 
with  population  growth,  but  it  is  often  quite  a  tenuous  link.  To  take  an 
example,  famines  lead to a  rise in mortality,  but an analysis of the mechanisms 
of  famine  shows  that demographic  factors are relatively insignificant and that 
other  factors,  such  as  political  problems,  access  to  resources,  control  of 
resources,  etc., have been more  important in the etiology of the great.famines. 
If  one  takes  the  environment,  and  I  presume  that  Mr  Tabutin  has  already 
discussed  this  particular  question,  demographic  factors  do  play  a  role,  of 
course they do,  but so do  relative prices,  technological choices,  etc.  So  here 
again demography  is significant,  but its significance is limited. 
A  second  introductory  remark:  the  question  of  the  interaction  between 
demographic  variables  and  economic  variables  is  a  controversial  one,  and  the 
controversy  has  been  going  on  for  a  long  time.  We  have  made  progress  since 
Malthus,  and  our  analysis  of  the  question  has  changed,  but  I  would  like  to 
stress that there is a  debate.  One  may  be a  supporter of  a  particular theory, 
which could be at one of the two  extremes;  on the one hand,  the theory supported 
by many  economists that 'essentially, demography has no  impact' -it changes the 
size,  but not  the nature,  of  the economic  problem;  the other is the view  that 
there  is  a  kind  of  demographic  determinism  - 'almost  everything  is  linked  to 
demography'.  That would  be exemplified by  the Club of Rome  a  few  years ago,  or 
even  by  the  populationist  theories,  since  everything  is  linked  one  way  or 
another.  By  this I  mean  that there is a  real debate.  This means  that progress 
has been made  in analysing the question,  that policies do not  need to be based 
on simplistic models,  which has  been the problem in many  countries,  especially 
in Africa,  where,  in  the  hope  of  cutting birth rates,  people  managed  to  fob 
- 47  -these countries off with some very simplistic models by claiming that population 
growth  was  a  disaster  and  that  was  all  there  was  to  be  said  about  it.  The 
progress  made  in analysing  the problem  must  be borne  in mind,  but  at the  same 
time  I  think it very important that there should be a  clear distinction between 
analysis and policy,  since in a  subject where there is a  technical debate,  the 
debate progresses at the  technical  level,  but policies must  be decided before 
any  final conclusions have been reached.  It is no good  imagining that a  clear-
cut conclusion will be reached  from  the scientific point of  view and that then 
we  shall act.  The  two  things are happening  in parallel. 
My  third introductory point:  I  should like to outline very briefly the changes 
in  thinking  on  this question  and  the  main  causal  connections  which  have  been 
made.  Without  going  into  great  detail,  things  happened  roughly  as  follows. 
About  twenty  years  ago,  in the  sixties  and  seventies,  a  view  of  the  economic 
effects  of  population  growth  was  developed  which  led  us  to  take  a  rather 
pessimistic,  even catastrophic,  view.  Population growth was blamed for a  number 
of  things,  or at least a  number  of  negative effects were  attributed to it. 
Briefly: 
At  first it was  thought that economic growth was  linked to an accumulation 
of capital and that the more children people had,  the less they would save; 
and therefore that high birth rates,  large numbers of children in families, 
would depress saving; since in the past demographic growth implied specific 
forms of investment,  there was  a  demand for investment linked to demography 
which  could  not  be  satisfied,  particularly  since  population  growth 
depressed  saving.  This  argument  is very  important;  it was  the  economic 
argument used as  the basis of,  and  the  justification for,  family planning 
policies. 
The  second argument was  linked to age structures.  The  underlying idea was 
that  high  birth  rates  led  to  a  disproportionate  number  of  young  people 
(young  =  not  old  enough  to  be  in  employment)  and  that  this  had  a 
correspondingly  negative  effect  on  the  ratio  of  employed  to  unemployed 
people.  If birth rates are too high,  there will be a  higher proportion of 
people  too young  to work.  This  argument  also  gave  demographic variation 
a  bad  name  and militated in favour of population restriction. 
The  third argument  was  concerned with maternal health and  the survival of 
mother and child,  the theory being that multiple births at short intervals 
affected  both  the  likelihood  of  the  mother  dying  and  infant  mortality 
rates. 
That is a  very brief overview of  how  people saw  things.  This  was  more  or less 
the  view  of  the  Club  of  Rome  in the  sixties and  seventies,  etc.  Things  have 
changed.  What  happened first was  that argument  no.  1,  the one  linking savings 
to population figures,  collapsed for  lack of  proof.  It is no  longer possible 
to maintain that there is an  inverse ratio between the number  of children in a 
family  and  its capacity  to  save.  We  can  see  very  clearly  what  happened  by 
looking at international institutions,  such·as the World  Bank,  which used this 
argument  over  a  long  period.  However,  if  you  look  at  the  Bank's  report  for 
1984,  which  I  believe  corresponds  to the  Mexico  Conference,  the  argument  has 
disappeared  and  instead  we  see  arguments  such  as  the  cost  of  education,  the 
environment,  soil  deterioration,  etc.,  being  used  to  support  a  policy  of 
population restriction. 
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the strongest argument.  It was  often used by countries like China  which for  a 
long,, time  did  not  want  to  use  an  economic  argument  that  they  considered  too 
Malthusian,  and which did not fit their ideology since it would  have  suggested 
that the demographic  problem had nothing to do with social organization. 
The  argument  concerning the ratio of  the employed to the unemployed  turned out 
to  be  highly  ambiguous.  People  said  that  high  birth  rates  produced  large 
numbers  of  young  unemployed  and  that,  therefore,  if birth  rates  fell,  the 
proportion of people in employment would grow.  But there was  a  detail which had 
perhaps been overlooked or underestimated,  namely the fact that what was  really 
being compared was  age categories.  It would have been correct to say,  'a drop 
in  birth  rates  raises  the  relative  number  of  people  of  an  age  to  be  in 
employment  in relation to young,  non-employed people'.  The  real  problem is to 
increase  the  number  of  people  in work,  and  what  happened  in  many  Third  World 
countries  is interesting,  because it has  been  one  of  the disappointing  things 
about certain birth regulation policies,  for  example in the Maghreb countries. 
In  the  Maghreb  countries,  unlike  sub-Saharan  Africa,  the  current  population 
growth rate is higher among  people of employable age  than in the population as 
a  whole.  If  the  growth  rate  of  the  economy  is not  such  as  to  enable  these 
people of working age to be absorbed,  unemployment rises.  So  the conclusion was 
a  little hasty.  It is useful to consider the ratio of people of  working age to 
that  of  people  under  working  age,  but  only  if  the  people  of  working  age  are 
actually in employment.  This is one of  the  limitations of  an  argument  which 
has  been used for  a  very  long  time. 
So  the old arguments  have  been rethought,  in a  way,  and  there has  also been  a 
certain amount  of progress in analysing the situation.  It has been shown  that 
the effects of population growth are more  complex  than the earlier,  simplistic 
view  had  suggested.  It has  been  shown,  for  example,  that  when  the effects of 
age  structure are studied the  impact  of  population growth  could be  a  positive 
one.  It  has  been  suggested  that  population  growth  is  one  of  the  factors 
enabling a  system of  property rights to be put in place;  that is to say that in 
a  system where there are no property rights,  [ .......... ],a crucial element in 
growth;  the  idea behind this view  is that growth  is not  so  much  a  question of 
capital  or  labour,  as  of  the  individual  having  an  incentive  to  engage  in 
economic activity.  And  it is clear that for the individual  to be motivated to 
save  and  invest and  work  for  growth,  he  must  see  some  return for  his efforts. 
And  this return is largely linked to property rights.  In  the Third World  the 
absence of property registers,  for example,  is a  factor which stands in the way 
of a  number of types of investment because it is impossible to record the nature 
of  the  property.  So  a  number  of  new  factors  have  been  introduced  into  the 
debate. 
The  progress  made  has  tended  to  exonerate  population  growth;  the  overall 
tendency has been to show  that population growth has  an  impact,  but that it is 
rather more subtle than some  of the models presented in the fifties which blamed 
it for almost everything.  It must be admitted,  however,  that there is a  certain 
ambiguity  in this new  view  of  things  because,  while it is true that  there has 
been a  change,  that new  factors have entered the analysis,  there has also been 
an  ideological  change.  There  is no  doubt,  for  example,  that  a  different view 
of  economic  growth  came  into  being  in  the  United  States  under  the  Reagan 
administration.  It was  thought that growth consisted essentially of putting in 
place  market  mechanisms,  and  people  came  to  the  conclusion  that  population 
figures  would  follow,  that  the  real  problem  was  to establish  or  return  to  a 
market  economy,  which  would  bring  about  a  rise  in the standard  of  living and 
- 49  -that eventually this would  somehow  solve the population problem.  Here  the new 
view contains a  mixture of analytical elements and of other elements which are 
more  ideological  {not  a  criticism),  but  perhaps  more  sensitive to  fluctuating 
fashions. 
The  second thing  I  should like to do  is to stress what  I  shall call,  if  I  may, 
three  'misapprehensions',  three errors of analysis which were  made  in the past 
and  which perhaps  led to misguided policies. 
Firstly,  population growth was  reduced to,  or identified with,  the birth rate. 
It was  assumed  that  'demographic  growth'  was  synonymous  with  the birth rate. 
Of  course there is some  truth in this,  in so  far as  the  long-term development 
of  a  given  community  will  depend essentially on  the birth rate.  It is one  of 
the indisputable conclusions of the studies made.  But while it is true that in 
the very  long  term the evolution of  a  community,  its age structure and rate of 
growth will depend on the birth rate,  in the medium  term  (in economists'  terms, 
one  generation,  i.e.  twenty  or thirty years)  variations  in mortality  and  life 
expectancy  in  particular,  as  well  as  migratory  patterns,  have  a  significant 
demographic and,  above all, economic impact.  This is an essential point because 
the  demographic  policy  implications  and  the  economic  effects  are  totally 
different  depending  on  whether  population growth  is a  result  of  a  high birth 
rate  or  a  rise  in life expectancy.  Just  by  way  of  an  example,  I  said  a  few 
moments  ago  that there is no  evidence that when  people have more  children they 
save  less.  But  on  the other hand,  it can be  shown  that if people  live longer 
they save more.  In particular, if they anticipate a  period of retirement at the 
end of their working life,  the expected length of  this period has an effect on 
their  saving  behaviour.  Thus  there  is  a  link  between  life  expectancy  and 
saving.  This means  that it is important to be clear on a  point which had  been 
entirely neglected  - whether,  when  talking of  demographic  growth,  people  were 
referring only  to  the birth rate  - as  was  in fact  the  case  - or  whether  life 
expectancy  was  also being taken into account. 
The  second  'error'  {in inverted commas)  has  to do  with the birth rate  (I think 
one of my  colleagues is going to talk about family planning): in the sixties and 
seventies,  the  great  age  of  family  planning  programmes,  it  was  implicitly 
assumed  that  the  interests of  couples  and  the interests of  the  community,  let 
us say of the country,  were identical; that it was  in people's interests to have 
fewer  children  and  that it was  in  the  interests  of  the  country  to  slow  down 
population growth and therefore that if people had more children than they were 
assumed  to  want,  it  was  because  the  cost  of  contraception  was  too  high  or 
because  people did not really know  what  was  in their own  interests. 
Policies  {the  Indian  policy,  for  example,  which  was  one  of  the  first)  were 
therefore directed at reducing the cost of contraception,  educating people and 
providing  access  to  contraception.  And  yet,  more  recent  studies  have  shown 
beyond any doubt that in some societies - many  societies,  even - it is desirable 
to  have  a  high birth rate,  I  mean  economically desirable.  In many  societies 
people  need  to  have  a  lot  of  children,  because  children  are  an  insurance, 
children are an investment,  because there is no social security system;  a  person 
may  want  to  have  a  daughter  available  when  they  reach  the  age  of  50,  for 
example,  and  to guarantee  a  surviving daughter at that age  you  need  to  have  a 
lot of children.  This is not true everywhere,  but it is true in many  parts of 
the world.  So  here we  have the following problem:  a  reduction in the birth rate 
may  appear desirable for  the community;  but  on  the other hand,  from  the point 
of  view of  the individual,  of  the couple,  it is economically desirable to have 
many  children;  so  there  is a  conflict,  which  may  be  resolved  by  a  population 
- 50  -policy, but,  of course,  if the problem has been incorrectly analysed,  and it was 
thought that people wanted to have fewer children,  the policy will no longer be 
eff~ctive.  Of  course,  policy-making  becomes  more  difficult  in  this  case. 
Peqple will say,  of course,  'Setting up a  social security system would be a  more 
eff~ctive way  of lowering the birth rate'.  Obviously.  But it is more difficult 
to set up  a  social security system,  one effect of which  might  be  to lower  the 
birth rate,  than to devise  a  population policy.  This also poses  a  problem of 
implementation,  because  demographic  policy  is  the  sphere  of  a  number  of 
different institutional departments. 
The  third  misapprehension  lies  in  an  underestimation  of  institutional  and 
political  factors.  There  was  a  received  version  of  the  economic  effect  of 
population growth,  which was  based on the experience in Asia - it was,  if I  can 
put it that way,  an Asian model,  conceived for  Bangladesh,  India,  etc.  It was 
then applied to almost everywhere else, regardless of the institutional aspect, 
which  is  so  central.  What  does  this  mean?  That  population  growth  can  have 
favourable  or  unfavourable  economic  effects,  depending  on  the  institutional 
variables  through  which  it operates.  And  this is  important,  because  in  many 
countries,  even if there is a  population problem,  even if a  long-term reduction 
in  the  rate  of  population  growth  would  have  a  positive  effect  on  living 
standards,  this fact  is not actually perceived,  is not  'internalized'.  Let  me 
give  you  an  example:  every  year  in Paris  we  hold  a  seminar  on  population  and 
development  issues,  to which  we  invite administrators  and  civil servants  from 
the  statistical  services  of  the  French-speaking  African  countries,  who  are 
working  on  population programmes,  funded  mainly  by  UNFPA,  whose  message  is to 
put  a  brake  on  population  growth.  At  this  seminar  I  always  hold  one 
'psychoanalytical'  session,  where  I  ask  the  participants,  who  are  all 
experienced people,  to try to forget  everything that's said,  everything we're 
told in the literature,  and to tell me  what  they  themselves  see as the problem 
with  development  in  their  countries.  Why  is  there  a  problem?  What  is  the 
handicap?  And  it is most interesting to see that,  when  people get away  from the 
received facts,  there are in fact,  for a  number  of different reasons,  very  few 
participants who  mention demographic reasons.  They  talk about more  traditional 
things  - history,  colonisation,  etc.  But  it is  very  clear  that  when  people 
really think,  leaving aside the accepted ideas,  they forget population - perhaps 
a  little too much,  sometimes.  I  would  like to stress this point,  and Africa is 
a  very  typical  example;  there  is  an  international  debate  on  the  question  of 
Africa,  which is solidly based but has not necessarily been internalized by the 
people who  are actually going to implement the policies.  They are the ones who, 
sooner or later,  will have  to act. 
My  third point,  a  rather more specific one,  concerns a  particular aspect of the 
economic  dimension  of  development  and  demography  - that  of  international 
migration. 
What  is  the  situation  here?  Let  us  take  the  case  of  Europe.  In  the  late 
fifties and the sixties there was  a  wave  of emigration to Europe,  which happened 
for  economic  reasons;  the  essential  reason  was  the  situation  in  Europe,  the 
demand  for  labour;  it was  the attraction of  Europe  that made  people  come,  not 
the poverty in their countries of origin,  as is sometimes claimed.  But  we  felt 
a  bit guilty in Europe  and  we  rationalized the problem by  saying,  'Yes,  we  got 
people  to  come  because  that suited our  own  interests,  but  emigration,  people 
leaving,  is also  good  for  development'.  Good  for  development  because  people 
leaving reduces  the pressure of  unemployment,  or underemployment,  because  the 
money  sent home  to their families by emigrants  (remittances, as they are called) 
improves  the  standard  of  living  there  and  because  when  the  emigrants  return 
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country.  So  we  rationalized the whole thing by saying,  'Okay,  we  gain from it, 
but  the  others  don't  lose  anything;  there  is  a  kind  of  international 
transmission of development as a  result of migration' .  Here again,  it is rather 
difficult to see  what  the  outcome really was,  but  on  the whole it seems  to be 
relatively positive.  There  are comparatively  few  examples of  countries  which 
have declined as a  direct result of migration.  And  then came  the second stage: 
in about  1973-74 the European countries,  for reasons of their own,  suspended or 
put  a  stop  to  immigration.  And  so  a  whole  new  set  of  problems  was  born:  we 
began to say,  'Instead of bringing people here,  we'll start encouraging them  to 
go  back;  we'll  promote  delocalization  of  companies,  so  that,  for  example,  a 
French company  which  employs  Moroccans will start a  branch in Morocco  with the 
help of a  French subsidy,  an interest subsidy,  and perhaps it will even give the 
Moroccans it employed  in France  jobs in Morocco  when  they return home.  It was 
what  was  called  the  new  international  division  of  labour.  The  effect  was 
extremely  limited,  for a  number  of  reasons. 
And  this brings  us  up  to  the present.  There  has  been  a  change  recently:  the 
underlying idea is still the  same,  the aim  is the  same,  but  in Europe  there is 
now  a  stronger desire to close our frontiers  (and  in fact this makes  the whole 
thing more plausible).  The countries of Europe are going to keep their borders 
closed,  certainly for  several  years  to come.  But  we  are aware  that  we  cannot 
continue  in  the  long  term  with  a  prosperous  Europe  alongside  other countries 
with small or negative growth - as has been the case in many  of the sub-Saharan 
countries of  Africa  for at least  ten decades  - and  so  something  must  be  done. 
So  we  have  to  think  of  an  alternative  to  migration,  which  would  consist  of 
opening  up  commercially,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  practising  a 
cooperation policy the effect of which would be to give people fewer reasons to 
leave their own  countries,  thus providing an indirect solution to the migration 
problem.  NAFTA  is another  example  of  the  same  thing.  It is  a  new  free  trade 
agreement,  which does not mention migration,  but migration is nevertheless what 
lies behind it: the idea is that the development  of Mexico,  which might  lead to 
outside openings in terms of goods and capital,  would,  in the long term,  reduce 
the Mexicans'  need to leave.  I  think we  can only agree that NAFTA  is necessary 
and  useful;  at any  event  I  am  in favour  of it;  we  must  support it,  but at the 
same  time  we  must  be  absolutely realistic.  What  do  I  mean  by  'realistic'?  I 
mean  two  things:  first,  the  fact  that  migration  never  starts  because  of  a 
difference in living standards.  A difference in living standards makes  existing 
migration patterns continue, but migration almost always starts when  the country 
of origin begins  its own  process  of  development;  in other words,  migration is 
the result of  the process of  development,  and not  vice versa.  If one  looks at 
what  happened  in Europe  in the sixties,  in almost  every case it was  the start 
of  the development process which caused migration to begin.  Here again,  there 
were specific reasons.  This means that to begin with these policies of removing 
trade  barriers  and  of  cooperation  will  favour  migration.  The  free  trade 
agreement between  the United States and Mexico will increase Mexican migration 
over  the next  ten years.  And  an agreement  such as that  envisaged between  the 
EU  and Morocco  will have  the same  effect in the short term.  That  is the first 
point. 
The second point is this:  migrants are at home  neither in their new  country nor 
in their country of origin.  There are individual differences.  For cooperation 
policies to lead finally to a  situation where people have less cause to emigrate 
(which is probably desirable  from  their point of view,  since people  in general 
prefer  to  stay  where  they  are),  cooperation  policy  and  the  removal  of  trade 
barriers  must  influence  people's  decisions  to  emigrate;  they  must  influence 
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concrete example to illustrate it.  Take  a  possible candidate for emigration -
a  Turk  or  a  Moroccan,  say.  What  is  the situation for  him?  Having  read  the 
economics  textbooks,  he may  expect an  improvement  in his standard of  living as 
a  result of  the developments in the economy  of his country brought  about by  an 
opening up of trade.  This is the Mexican model.  Or  else he packs his bags and 
goes  to  a  new  country.  These  are  the  two  options.  They  are simplified,  but 
they  illustrate  the  basic  problem.  There  are  two  fundamental  differences 
between  the  two  options:  the first is the question of  who  decides,  the  second 
is  how  long  it will  take  for  the  man's  standard  of  living  to  improve.  In 
countries of origin where  there is great political uncertainty and very little 
confidence in the ability of the government to carry out development policies -
in many  countries therefore,  although we  will not name  them  - the migrant will 
obviously prefer to be master of his own  fate and his own  standard of  living to 
waiting for the political system to act for him.  And  secondly, it is also clear 
- here  one  can do  the sums,  and  I  have  - that he will  improve his standard of 
living more  quickly by making a  move  himself  than by waiting for this to happen 
as a  result of his country's development policies.  Fundamentally,  migration is 
an  individual  strategy to  improve one's standard of  living,  an active move  to 
change an unsatisfactory situation, as opposed to the nineteenth-century vision 
of the working classes influencing their fate through collective action.  These 
points seem very important to me,  since they mean  that cooperation policies are 
necessary,  that they will have  an effect in the  long term,  but that  we  must  be 
realistic  and  not  attempt  to sell  people  the  idea  that  in  a  few  years'  time 
there  will  be  no  reason  to  emigrate  any  more  simply  as  a  result  of  trade 
deregulation or cooperation. 
Finally,  I  should like to emphasize  two  other points. 
The  first is that one of  the problems  in discussing demographic-economic  links 
is the fact that there are conflicts of interest.  And  where there are conflicts 
the  solution  must  be  arrived  at  via  the  political  system,  i.e.  through  the 
voicing  of  political  preferences.  But  in  many  of  the  countries  in question 
political opinion does not necessarily reflect the sum  of national preferences. 
There  are conflicts  between  individuals  and  the  nation.  There  are conflicts 
between  generations.  There  is  the question  of  the  environment.  What  is  the 
environment  in fact,  from  an economic point of  view?  If the world lasted only 
a  few  moments,  there would be no environmental problem.  I  would be well advised 
to consume  as  much  as possible and  use  as  many  of  the existing resources  as  I 
could.  But  if  the  world  lasts  for  a  long  time,  I  have  to  strike  a  balance 
between what  I  consume  today and what  I  shall consume  tomorrow.  The  individual 
will not strike this balance.  It has to be struck through the political system. 
The  second,  which  seems  to me  to be of'crucial importance,  is the question of 
the  time  scale.  It has  to  be  said  that  the  international  institutions  and 
governments  are  in  rather  too  much  of  a  hurry  (they  speak  of  the  decade  of 
development).  No  country in the history of humanity has ever developed in ten 
years.  The  idea  is meaningless.  I  think it is very  important  to understand 
that we  are talking about very long-term developments here and that,  even with 
rapid  growth  rates,  economies  which  are  centuries  behind  because  of  problems 
connected with education,  technology,  custom,  work organization,  etc.  cannot be 
brought up to date overnight.  And  there is a  great danger here,  because,  since 
we  find it intolerable that  an  economic  situation cannot  change  in ten years, 
we  have a  tendency  to say,  'But population problems  can be dealt with here and 
now,  and  at  least  something  will  have  been  done'.  I  think  this  is  a  great 
danger,  because the ultimate effect will  simply be to increase frustration and 
- 53  -the  expectation  of  change,  and  in  my  opinion  this  is  one  of  the  underlying 
reasons  for migration. 
- 54  -6.  FAMILY  PLANNING  PROGRAMMES  IN  LDC'S 
Mr  Van  Ginneken,  Dutch Institute of Population Studies,  the Hague 
I  will  talk  about  one  aspect  of  population  policies  in  developing  countries 
namely  family  planning programmes  in LDC's. 
My  presentation will consist of  three parts.  Firstly I  will describe the 
current situation with respect to family planning programmes in developing 
countries.  Then  I  will outline what has to be achieved in the next 7  to 10 
years in terms of decrease in fertility, increase in contraceptive practice 
and  in  funding.  Finally,  I  will  argue  that  a  substantial  lowering  of 
fertility in developing countries will not be achieved by  family planning 
programmes alone;  they should be part of a  comprehensive population policy. 
1.  Achievements  by  family  planning programmes  so  far 
The most important components of a  family planning programme are the actual 
prov1s1ons  of  contraceptive  methods  and  an  outreach  component. 
Contraceptive services are often provided by clinics and hospitals as part 
of  maternal  and  child  health  services.  But  contraceptives  are  also 
distributed  through  other  channels  such  as  pharmacies  and  drug  stores. 
Another  important  component  consists  of  visits  by  fieldworkers  who  make 
home  visits  to  motivate  couples  and  to distribute contraceptives.  Those 
fieldworkers often also provide information on  maternal  and child health. 
They  are  therefore  not  comparable  with  family  planning  programmes  as  we 
know  them  in countries of  the European Union. 
This  leads to the  question what  family  planning programmes  have  achieved 
so far.  In developing countries  the contraceptive prevalence rate is now 
about  50.  This  means  that  about  50  %  of  couples  (married  or  living 
together)  use  contraceptives  (modern  or  traditional  methods).  A 
contraceptive  prevalence  rate  of  50  %  is  already  fairly  high,  but  one 
reason  why  it is so high is the fact  that China  is included.  If  China is 
excluded,  the contraceptive prevalence rate goes down  to 35  %.  And  this CPR 
is actually lower  in Africa  (about  16  %).  (It used to be  25-30%  in about 
1965-70.) 
To  give an idea how  this situation contrasts with MDC's  I  can mention that 
the  CPR  is about  70  % to  75  %. 
The  most  frequently  used  contraceptive  methods  in  LDCs  are  female 
sterilization  (33  %),  followed  by  the  IUD  (22  %),  the pill  (13  %),  male 
sterilization  (11  %)  and  the condom  (7  %). 
In  order  to  provide  these  services,  many  LDCs  have  developed  impressive 
programmes.  In order to get an idea about what  we  are talking here,  I  will 
give  a  few  figures  on  personnel  employed  in  the  largest  of  these 
programmes:  China  150.000 persons,  India 114.000,  Indonesia nearly 55.000 
and Colombia  12.000. 
How  much  do  these family planning programmes  in LDCs  cost? Rough  estimates 
come  to nearly 4 billion US$.  This amount  is made  up of  3 billion $  spent 
- 55  -by  governments  of  LDCs  themselves  and  about  750  million  $  in the  form  of 
development aid from  MDCs  as well as the World Bank.  A considerable amount 
of  the  aid  from  MDCs  is channelled  through  UNFPA.  The  US  is  by  far  the 
largest bilateral donor with a  budget  of nearly  250  million $. 
The  750  million  $  seem  a  lot  but  in  practice it is  very  little;  it is 
actually  1.2  % of  the total development  aid. 
2.  Family planning in LDCs  in 2000  and  financial  implications 
We  now  come  to the question what has  to be achieved with respect to family 
planning in LDCs  in the future and in particular in the next  7  years until 
2000.  Estimates on future levels of financial  inputs have been made  by the 
UNFPA  and the World  Bank.  Their estimates date  from  about  1990  and  I  will 
summarize  the  findings  starting from  1990.  How  much  needs  to be  achieved 
depends  on  the  objectives  which  LDCs  want  to  realize.  We  can  aim  at 
realizing the medium-variant  of  the projections of  the  UN  for  LDCs  which 
lead to an increase in the population of  LDCs  from  5.3 billion in  1990  to 
6.4  billion  in  2000.  It would  be  even  better  to  aim  at  achieving  a  low 
variant  of  the  UN  projection  which  would  mean  that  the  population  would 
increase to 6.1  billion in 2000. 
I  we  aim  for  the  medium  level  expected  population  increase,  the 
contraceptive prevalence  rate will  have  to  increase  to  56  % and  in this 
figure China is included. This means  that there will be 520  million couples 
who  will be family planning users and this means  164  million more than now. 
If LDCs  as  a  whole decide to adopt  the  low  variant of  the  UN  projections, 
the  CPR  will  increase to  64  %.  This  would  mean  that there  would  be  about 
570  million users,  an  increase of  210  million users in a  period of  around 
10  years. 
These  figures  show  that an enormous effort is required in the near  future 
in terms  of  personnel  and  funds. 
It has been calculated that if we  were to aim at the low variant of  the  UN 
in 2000,  the total budget  would  be  8  billion US  $  per  year  roughly  twice 
as much  as is currently spent. It has been proposed that 4,5 billion should 
be  made  available  by  LDCs  themselves,  an  increase of  50  % in comparison 
with the amount currently spent  (3 billion)  and 3,5 billion$ by MDCs  which 
would mean  an increase of 2, 75  billion in comparison with the current level 
of  750  million$  (an  increase of  350  %). 
If  this  were  to  be  done,  the  percentage  of  development  aid  spent  on  FP 
would  go  up  from  1,2% to  5%  and this 3.5 billion$ would  amount  to  two 
hundredths of  one  percent of  the Gross  National  Product of  the MDCs. 
Expansion  of  the  development  aid  of  the  European  Union  for  FP  could 
therefore make  an important contribution towards achieving this objective. 
If we  accept  the figures cited above,  this means  that the funds  to be made 
available  by  MDCs  have  to  increase  from  about  750  million  $  in  1990  to 
about  3,5 billion in 2000. 
3.  a.  No  coercion  - it is unethical  and it is counterproductive in the  long 
run and couples  should decide  freely. 
- 56  -b.  Family  planning  programmes  together  with  other  social  programmes,  in 
particular  education  of  women,  improved  quality  and  quantity  of  such 
services;  family planning programmes are not synonymous with population 
policy. 
- 57  -7.  THE  GERMAN  POSITION  ON  POPULATION  POLICY  AND  FAMILY  PLANNING  IN  DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Dr Michael Bohnet, Ministerialdiriqent, Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation 
and  Development,  Germany 
Mr  Chairman, 
Thank  you  for  this opportunity to give  a  brief  account  of  the  German  position 
on population policy and  family  planning in developing countries. 
I  have  recently  returned  from  the  meeting  of  ministers  of  the  non-aligned 
countries on 9-13 November  in Indonesia,  and  I  should  like to begin by summing 
up  my  main  impressions of  that conference. 
What  was  most striking was  the clear support for  family planning,  the  emphasis 
on  preserving  the  family  as  the  foundation  of  all social  life,  the declining 
importance  of  religious  issues  for  family  planning,  and  the  view  that 
international migrations are an unavoidable corollary of historical events.  The 
recommendations drawn up  for the Cairo conference of non-aligned countries are 
very  detailed,  very  concrete  and  largely  free  of  ideological  baggage.  The 
outstanding  successes  in  family  planning  achieved  by  many  countries  of  Asia 
(e.g.  China,  Korea,  Thailand,  Indonesia,  Malaysia)  stand as  an  example  to  the 
countries of  Africa  and  some  Latin American states. 
I  should now  like to set out Germany's  position on the topic of  population and 
development. 
Population growth is the most pressing problem the world has to tackle.  Global 
politics must  embrace population policy.  The  population of  the world stands at 
around  5.5  billion,  and  is  growing  by  ~ quarter  of  a  million  daily  or  100  m 
every  year  - more  than  the population of  the Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  By 
the year 2000  there will be 6.25 m people in the world.  80%  of this population 
increase will  take place in the cities;  it is equivalent to  10  new  cities the 
size of  Paris every year. 
But  population growth cannot  be expressed solely in figures.  When  we  discuss 
of population we  have to look at the complex relationship between population and 
available resources.  In many  developing countries the growth in the population 
is  outstripping  economic  growth,  with  the  result  that  per  capita  income  is 
falling.  Progress achieved in providing people with social infrastructures in 
the  field  of  education  or  health  is  being  cancelled  out  by  the  r~s~ng 
population.  It is the poorest developing countries,  which  are also  those with 
the highest rates of  population growth,  which are hardest hit in this respect. 
Of  course poverty,  famine,  environmental damage,  migrations and armed conflicts 
in the world have  many  causes.  But there is no doubt that the rapid growth of 
the world's population is a  central factor which considerably exacerbates these 
problems.  The  human  time-bomb  is ticking.  We  must  get  away  from  the  notion 
that economic,  social and environmental progress can be achieved as widely and 
as  fast  as  the  constantly  growing  world  population demands.  The  problem  can 
only be  resolved once  we  have  succeeded in stabilizing the world population. 
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sustainable development  were  already  on  the  agenda,  and  measures  to slow down 
population  growth  were  described  there  as  an  essential  precondition  for 
sustainable development.  This  interaction between population,  environment and 
development  will  be  the  central  topic  of  discussion  at  the  International 
Conference on Population and Development  to be held in Cairo in 1994,  which is 
expected to provide important incentives to population and development policy. 
Many  developing  countries  have  already  begun  to  integrate  population  policy 
measures into their development strategies.  In this they are supported by  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  which  has  declared  population  policy  to  be  an 
important aspect of  combating poverty in the context of  its development policy 
for the 1990s.  In our cooperation on  population issues we  are pursuing a  double 
strategy,  which  targets  the  two  main  causes  of  the  high  rate  of  population 
growth,  namely the lack of  family planning facilities and the poor economic and 
social situation in the countries concerned. 
The first priority of Germany's support programme is therefore to provide people 
with  information  on  methods  of  contraception  and  with  family  planning 
facilities.  By  family  planning  we  mean  a  couple's free  and  informed decision 
on  the  number  of  children  they  have  and  the  interval  between  them.  This 
definition  of  family  planning  excludes  the  use  of  abortion,  compulsory 
sterilization or material inducements  (e.g.  financial support),  since these may 
impair the  freedom  of decision of  the often desperately poor  target group. 
The  poor  health  care  provision  in many  developing  countries,  to  which  family 
planning  is  to  a  large  extent  linked,  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  as  yet 
inadequate distribution of family planning facilities.  This is a  major problem 
particularly  in  rural  areas  with  poor  overall  infrastructures.  The  German 
Government  therefore  supports  complementary  methods  of  contraceptive 
distribution,  e.g community-based distribution,  social marketing  (distribution 
of subsidised contraceptives using a  marketing strategy)  and the participation 
of non-governmental organizations.  The  family planning programmes aim to target 
men  as  well  as  women,  since  it  is  particularly  important  to  raise  men's 
awareness  of  the  importance  of  family  planning. 
The  German  Government's  second  priority  in  terms  of  population  policy  is  to 
support measures in the fields of health,  education,  nutrition and promotion of 
the  role  of  women.  Experience  so  far  shows  that  improvements  in  these  areas 
influence reproductive behaviour.  Enhancing the role of  women  is particularly 
important.  How  can a  woman  who  has had no  education,  is economically dependent 
and  has  no  rights  take  a  decision  as  an  equal  partner  on  whether  and  when  to 
have children?  It is notable that in almost all countries women's  education is 
linked to a  drop  in the birth rate.  Women  who  have  had  seven  years  education 
are  2  1/2  times more  likely to use  contraception  than  those  with no  schooling 
at all. 
The  total bilateral  and  multilateral  aid accorded  by  Germany  in  the  field  of 
family  planning in developing countries doubled  from  1990  to  1993,  from  DM  74 
m in 1990  to around  OM  155  m in 1993.  Bilateral measures  accounted for  around 
two-thirds  of  the  support  (OM  103  m)  while the remaining third  (DM  52  m)  went 
on support for multilateral organizations, notably the UN's  Fund for Populat1on 
Activities  (UNFPA)  (OM  43.2 m in 1993)  and the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation  (IPPF)  (OM  8.8 min 1993). 
- 59  -If the developing countries  and  the industrialized countries work  together it 
may  be possible to achieve the necessary reduction in the world population and 
in this way  to create the  conditions  for  effective development  cooperation  in 
all areas.  Hopeful signs can already be seen.  Worldwide  the average number of 
children  per  mother  has  fallen  from  5  to  3  within  a  generation,  with  a 
particularly marked decline in the developing countries.  Over  the same  period 
the  use  of  contraceptives  has  risen  from  9%  to  around  50%,  meaning  that  in 
practice half  of  all  couples  in developing  countries  are  using  contraception 
(e.g.  70%  in Thailand,  50%  in Indonesia,  45%  in India,  40%  in Bangladesh,  50% 
in Mexico,  12%  in Tanzania and  10%  in Nigeria).  However,  it is estimated that 
around  100  m couples who  would  like to practise contraception are unable to do 
so  because  the  facilities are  not  available.  One  side-effect  of  this is the 
number  of  abortions,  which  currently  stands  at  around  25  m  per  year  in 
developing countries. 
Many  governments,  particularly  in African  countries,  which  only  a  decade  ago 
were  very  reluctant  to  discuss  population  problems,  have  now  changed  their 
attitude.  The  meeting of  ministers of  the  non-aligned states,  attended by  71 
countries  from  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin  America,  expressed  clear  support  for 
family  planning.  The  importance  of  religious  issues  in  family  planning  is 
declining  more  and  more,  proving  that  cultural  and  religious  objections  to 
contraception  can  be  overcome.  Buddhist  Thailand,  Islamic  Indonesia  and  the 
countries of  the Caribbean,  notably Jamaica,  have  shown  that it is possible to 
bring  about  a  perceptible  reduction  in  fertility  rates  in  widely  differing 
societies  in  a  surprisingly  short  time.  China,  Korea,  Sri  Lanka,  Malaysia, 
Colombia,  Chile,  Mauritius and Tunisia have also achieved massive reductions in 
their rates of  population growth. 
The  developing  countries  have  declared  their  willingness  to  cooperate  on 
population  issues  and  have  set  quantitative  targets  for  slowing  the  rate  of 
their  population  growth,  though  they  cannot  achieve  these  aims  without 
international aid.  The  conditions for action are in place,  and it is now  time 
to take that action,  for tomorrow's parents have already been born.  Failure to 
do  so could have  incalculable consequences. 
- 60  -ANNEX 
Resolution adopted by  the European Parliament on  11  March  1994 
Resolution on the demographic situation and  development 
The  European Parliament, 
having  regard to the motion  for  a  resolution by  Mr  Galland  on  demography 
and development  (83-1655/91), 
having regard to the resolution of  the Development  Cooperation Council  of 
18  November  1992  on  European cooperation  in the  field of  family  planning 
and  the  work  to  be  done  in  this  area  by  Member  State  and  Commission 
experts, 
having  regard  to  the  Commission  Communication  to  the  Council  and  the 
European Parliament of  4  November  1992  on demography,  family planning and 
cooperation with developing countries  (SEC(92)2002), 
having  regard to the observations  made  during  the hearing on  the  subject 
in  question  held  by  its  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation  on  25 
November  1993, 
having regard to the Declaration of  the Rights of the Child of  20  November 
1959  and  the Convention on  the Rights of  the Child of  20  November  1989, 
having  regard  to  the  World  Population Action  Plan  (1974)  and  the  Mexico 
Declaration  (1984), 
having  regard to Rule  45  of its Rules  of  Procedure, 
having regard to the report by the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
(A3-0052/94), 
A.  whereas  in  absolute  terms  population  densities  are  much  higher  in 
economically  advanced countries  than in underdeveloped countries, 
B.  whereas  in  many  cases,  in  comparison  with  developed  countries, 
underdeveloped countries are rich in raw  materials and have vast areas of 
territory which are not  exploited, 
C.  whereas  therefore  economic  and  social  underdevelopment  is  due  less  to 
demography  than  to other factors,  such as  inadequate vocational  training 
and centuries of exploitation by rich countries to the detriment of poorer 
countries, 
D.  whereas it is currently  a  feature of  the world population  situation that 
there  are  enormous  differences  between  regions  of  the  world  as  regards 
population density,  health,  pollution,  consumption of  resources,  consumer 
behaviour etc.; whereas poverty is causing great difficulties, particularly 
to the so-called developing countries,  while disproportionate consumption 
of  resources occurs  in industrialized and rich countries, 
- 61  -E.  whereas  the race  between  industrialized countries to produce  and  consume 
most,  and  the  need  to  export  goods  which  is  forced  upon  developing 
countries,  are aggravating existing problems and imbalances,  including the 
imbalance  between population density and the availability of resources in 
these countries, and hence fundamentally endangering all efforts to achieve 
international  justice and sustainable,  acceptable development, 
F.  whereas the relationship between consumption,  technology and population is 
very complex;  recognizing the  impact of consumption patterns in the North 
on  environmental destruction, 
G.  whereas not only this demographic situation but above all the fundamental 
global  imbalance,  covered in recent years  in particular by the Brundtland 
Report  ('Our Common  Future') and the UNCED  on behalf of the United Nations, 
are  factors  leading  to  destabilization  of  the  political  and  social 
situation  of  nations  worldwide  and  present  fresh  challenges  to  whole 
regions  because of  the migration they cause, 
H.  deploring  the  fact  that  to  date  female  sterilization  remains  the  most 
common  means  of  birth control;  noting  that  there  are  often  grounds  for 
doubting whether it is genuinely  carried out with  the  full  awareness  and 
free  consent of  the  women  concerned,  because  the overriding objective of 
reducing the birth rate in developing countries is sometimes pursued quite 
ruthlessly,  so that measures have even come  to light which were carried out 
without  the  women  concerned  being  informed,  in  some  cases  with  serious 
consequences  for  their health, 
I.  deploring  the  fact  that  so-called  family  planning  policy  has  to  date 
largely been characterized by the absence of self-determination for women, 
respect for their health and mental  and physical integrity,  comprehensive 
and  objective  information  about  risks  and  side-effects  associated  with 
contraceptives and studies and information about natural methods of birth 
control,  reliable medical prior care and aftercare,  the involvement of men 
in preventing unwanted pregnancies,  and the education required in order to 
make  a  genuinely  free decision to opt for parenthood, 
J.  whereas  the  EU  should  increase  its  support  to  ACP  states  engaged  in 
structural  adjustment  programmes,  to help  them  maintain  and  improve  upon 
their  basic  social  expenditure  in  the  education,  health  and  housing 
sectors,  which is critical for efficient family  planning, 
K.  whereas the level of education of women  is the most  important factor in the 
decision on  how  many  children to have;  whereas  in every country there is 
a  direct link between raising the level of education of women  and reducing 
the birth rate, 
L.  whereas  acceptable  birth  control  can  only  succeed  in  the  context  of  an 
overall  political  strategy  in  the  health,  education,  social,  cultural, 
information,  consumer behaviour,  resource consumption and economic areas; 
whereas  there  is  a  need,  first  and  foremost,  for  an  ethical decision  on 
self-restraint  everywhere  where  the  imbalances  so  far  created  no  longer 
spontaneously correct themselves, 
M.  whereas  every  couple  has  the  inalienable  right  to  opt  for  responsible 
parenthood, 
- 62  -N.  whereas all family  planning policies must  be  founded  on  a  due  regard  for 
the fundamental rights and freedom of choice of the individual; whereas any 
move  to  use  coercion  - regardless  of  the  institution  behind  it  - is 
completely unacceptable and  must  be rejected as unethical,  since forcible 
population policy (either to increase or reduce the population) is a  highly 
questionable  and  often  brutal  form  of  interference  in  people's  private 
lives, 
0.  concerned at the distortions in demographic patterns caused by AIDS,  which 
may  alter the population structures of  certain countries, 
P.  whereas  with  regard  to  issues  concerned  with  self-restraint  in  consumer 
behaviour,  population  density  and  population  trends,  consumption  or 
conservation of  natural  resources,  international  environmental  pollution 
and  the like,  the  European  Union  has  so  far displayed inaction or  simply 
made  statements, 
Q.  whereas  it is  important  to  consider  demographic  issues  from  an  ethical 
point  of  view  in  order  to  avoid  adopting _a  merely  economic  approach  to 
them; 
1.  Stresses  that  the  socio-economic  growth  of  the  poorest  peoples  depends 
primarily on  the solidarity of rich peoples,  on  the establishment of trade 
relations  between  developed  and  developing  countries  which  are  fair  and 
opposed to any  form  of exploitation,  and on education based on  the values 
of  life,  the  family,  solidarity,  responsibility,  and  thorough  vocational 
training for  young  people; 
2.  Emphasizes the link,  specific to each case,  between a  balanced population 
density and socio-economic development and takes the view that economic and 
commercial  structures  which  are  fair  for  all  peoples  are  needed  if 
excessive population growth is to be corrected by  means  of a  comprehensive 
equalization of  social conditions; 
3.  Takes  the view that the formulation  and  implementation by  the Union  of  an 
effective  policy  with  comprehensive  objectives  to  achieve  population 
balance  and  sustainable  development  towards  international  equity  are 
preconditions  for practical action; 
4.  Calls  accordingly  for  intensified  and  better  coordinated  efforts  by  the 
Member  States and  the  European  Union; 
5.  Calls  for  the  Commission  to  establish  the  appropriate  preconditions  in 
terms of staffing and organizational arrangements to enable it to formulate 
the  objectives  called  for  in  paragraph  3  in  an  appropriate  manner  and 
ensure that they  are taken into account  in all other fields of policy; 
6.  Considers  that statistical systems  equipped  to collect reliable data  and 
family  planning services should be set up  in the developing countries; 
7.  Is aware that a  process of rethinking is needed both in industrialized and 
in relatively unindustrialized countries  and  urges  that  this  process  be 
reciprocal  so  that  both  parties  remove  part of  the  burden  on  the  global 
environment  in  accordance  with  their  specific  responsibility  and 
capacities; 
- 63  -8.  Stresses that the main thrust behind this change of approach will come  from 
women,  provided  that  the  social,  economic  and  cultural  preconditions  are 
right,  and  therefore  recommends  the active promotion of  self-organization 
and  improvements  in women's  educational  and  occupational  opportunities  in 
both developing and  industrialized countries; 
9.  Takes  the  view  that  no  authoritarian family  planning policy of  any  kind  -
whether to increase or limit population - would be ethically acceptable,  and 
calls for all family planning measures to take full account of the cultural, 
social  and  economic  conditions  of  the  population  concerned  and  the  basic 
requirements of international  justice; 
10.  Calls for family planning to be planned,  decided,  organized and  implemented 
by  the population concerned,  and especially by  women,  and  to  form  part of 
a  broad health policy which  should also  include psychological,  health and 
social assistance in dealing with difficult or unwanted pregnancies;  takes 
the  view  that  appropriate  and  suitably  sensitive  advisory  services 
(accessible both to women  and to their male partners)  could help to provide 
the necessary  information;  calls  for  NGOs  and  relevant  local  associations 
to be given the opportunity to play a  central part in this; 
11.  Takes  the view that family policy should also provide for the education of, 
and  the promotion of  literacy among,  adolescents  and  young  people of  both 
sexes,  and should include the provision of information on reliable and legal 
methods  of birth control  - which  could be undertaken as  part of  schooling 
and  vocational  training  as  well  as  in  other  social  learning  processes, 
through the media and so on - and stresses the fundamental role of education 
for  women; 
12.  Believes that it should be possible for  free decisions of  women  or couples 
to  employ  birth control  measures  to  be  carried out  without  any  financial 
burden or social  impediments; 
13.  Calls on the Commission and Member  States to ensure that they do not provide 
any support  for  family  planning programmes  which  involve coercive measures 
or health risks for  the people concerned; 
14.  Considers  that,  given  the  interaction  between  demographic  and  economic 
factors,  secure prospects must  be offered to women  and  men  in the areas of 
employment  and  the equitable distribution of  resources,  land,  appropriate 
technology,  education  and  access  to  credit,  and  that  family  support 
programmes,  child care and  pension schemes  must  be altered accordingly; 
15.  Firmly  believes  that  it should  be  actively  involved  in  the  third  United 
Nations International Conference on Population and Development  in Cairo in 
September  1994; 
16.  Urges  the Commission to pay greater attention to the demographic  impact  of 
large-scale development programmes,  not least in the area of health care and 
education,  particularly in view of the need to improve the level of women's 
education and their social status; 
17.  Insists that the Commission and Council should always inform and consult it 
promptly  with  regard  to  Union  plans  and  measures,  particularly  with 
- 64  -reference to the Union's participation in the  forthcoming world population 
conference in Cairo,  to which it resolves  to send a  delegation; 
18.  Instructs its President to  forward  this resolution to the Commission,  the 
Council,  the Co-Presidents of  the  ACP-EEC  Joint  Assembly,  the  governments 
of  the Member  States and the  UN  Secretary-General. 
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